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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Battle of Sailor’s Creek: A Study 
in Leadership.   (December 2005)  
Cloyd Allen Smith Jr., B.A., Slippery 
Rock University 
Chair: Dr. Joseph Dawson 
 
 
The Battle of Sailor’s Creek, 6 April 1865, has been 
overshadowed by Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House 
several days later, yet it is an example of the Union 
military war machine reaching its apex of war making 
ability during the Civil War.  Through Ulysses S. Grant’s 
leadership and that of his subordinates, the Union armies, 
specifically that of the Army of the Potomac, had been 
transformed into a highly motivated, organized and 
responsive tool of war, led by confident leaders who 
understood their commander’s intent and were able to 
execute on that intent with audacious initiative in the 
absence of further orders.  After Robert E. Lee’s Army of 
Northern Virginia escaped from Petersburg and Richmond on 2 
April 1865, Grant’s forces chased after Lee’s forces with 
the intent of destroying the mighty and once feared 
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protector of the Confederate States in the hopes of 
bringing a swift end to the long war.  At Sailor’s Creek, 
Phil Sheridan, Grant’s cavalry commander was able to put 
his forces south and west of Lee’s Army trapping it between 
Sheridan’s cavalry and George Meade’s Army of the Potomac.  
After fighting a brutal, close quarters engagement, Union 
forces captured or killed the majority of two of Lee’s 
corps, commanded by Richard H. Anderson and Richard S. 
Ewell, and severely attrited a third corps under John B. 
Gordon, leaving Lee only James Longstreet’s corps intact to 
continue the struggle.     
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
If someone were to mention the Civil War in a room 
full of Americans and ask them to recite a fact or two 
about the end of the war, many would list Robert E. Lee’s 
surrender of his Army of Northern Virginia to Ulysses S. 
Grant. Others, if asked about a decisive battle during the 
war, might select Gettysburg, Vicksburg or Antietam.  Few, 
if any, in response to either question would cite the 
Battle of Sailor’s Creek on 6 April 1865.1  This, the last 
desperate and decisive battle of the Civil War, has been 
all but forgotten in American history, overshadowed by the 
devastation in Richmond and Petersburg and even more so by 
Lee’s surrender at Appomattox Court House, Virginia, three 
days later.   
In his memoirs, General Philip H. Sheridan, the 
ranking Union general at Sailor’s Creek, stated that 
although the battle was “one of the severest conflicts of 
the war . . . the fight was so overshadowed by the stirring 
___________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Military 
History. 
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events of the surrender three days later, that the battle 
has never been accorded the prominence it deserves.”2  
Indeed the fog of war has obscured the historical account 
of the Appomattox Campaign, for even now, over a century 
later, the words of Brigadier General J. Warren Kiefer 
still hold true: “It may be strange that, under such 
circumstances, one of the greatest battles of the bloodiest 
of modern wars should be overlooked by the writers of 
history.”3  
 As winter turned to spring in 1865, Union forces under 
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant were preparing for the 
upcoming spring offensive.  Southern military leaders 
thinking about the approaching warm spring weather and the 
renewed clashes it would bring with Grant’s massive war 
machine were contemplating how they were going to survive. 
Confederate officers focused on efforts to keep the 
hungry and desperate men in their ranks from deserting and 
devoted a number of infantry and cavalry units toward the 
sole purpose of policing up the deserters.4  In Lee’s 
Miserables, historian J. Tracey Power contends that above 
the continuous casualties from disease and federal bullets, 
desertion was “a constant drain on the army’s effective 
strength and [was] never more so than during the last year 
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of the war.”5  In Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, many 
units came from outside the state.  Regiments from Georgia, 
Alabama, Texas, Mississippi, South Carolina, and North 
Carolina made up a large portion of Lee’s army.6  Beyond 
the normal concerns of hunger and fear of being killed, 
soldiers from these regiments deserted in large numbers to 
go and protect their homes against William Tecumseh 
Sherman’s punitive march across Georgia and into the 
Carolinas.  Colonel Archer Anderson, assigned by the 
Secretary of War to inspect conscript service outside of 
Richmond, wrote that the Army of Northern Virginia “was 
demoralized, not by the enemy in its front, but by the 
enemy in Georgia and the Carolinas.”7  Many family members 
encouraged their men in correspondence to desert and come 
home.8   
Throughout the previous winter, Lee’s army was further 
reduced when state governors called on Lee to return some 
of their state regiments to defend against Sherman’s 
invasion.   The Confederate commander sent several of his 
best units including a division and brigade of infantry and 
more importantly a division of cavalry to North and South 
Carolina to help defend against Sherman’s onslaught.  In 
December 1865, Lee sent Major General Robert Hokes’ 
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division to North Carolina.  The following January, 
Brigadier General James Conner’s Brigade, from Major 
General Joseph Kershaw’s Division, followed.  Many 
considered Conner’s brigade, once commanded by Kershaw 
himself, the finest in the Army of Northern Virginia, and a 
significant loss to Lee’s combat strength.  The following 
month, Lee ordered Major General Matthew Butler’s cavalry 
division to South Carolina.9  Despite Lee’s efforts to 
appease the leadership of the states that Sherman invaded, 
many Southerners still hurled criticism at the Confederate 
government for abandoning the defense of its Southern 
states.  Governor Joe Brown of Georgia declared that his 
state “was abandoned to her fate neglected by Confederate 
authorities and while her Army of able bodied Sons were 
held for [defense] of other States. . . . Georgia was 
compelled to rely upon a few old men and boys.”10  Lee 
spread his remaining forces in a thin defensive line around 
Petersburg and Richmond, defending the capital—the symbol 
of the Confederacy.   
Some within the South proposed the drastic solution of 
recruiting slaves into the ranks to solve their shortage of 
soldiers.  As early as September 1864, General Lee, 
responding to the mounting pressure of defending an ever-
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increasing line against the Union envelopment, wrote to 
President Davis to recommend that slaves be used in the 
ranks to relieve able-bodied white men currently being 
employed as “teamsters, cooks, mechanics, and laborers.”11  
That same month Lee wrote Confederate Secretary of War, 
James A. Seddon, requesting immediately “five thousand 
Negroes for thirty days to labor on the fortifications.”12  
By March 1865, the Confederate Congress, unable to ignore 
the shortage of manpower within the Confederate army, 
passed a law supported by Davis himself, allowing for the 
recruitment of former slaves into the ranks.13  Once again, 
Lee wrote to Davis requesting immediate implementation of 
the new law.14  What relief the new law had in manpower is 
questionable; at Sailor’s Creek there were no Confederate 
colored units, but its passage clearly indicated the 
desperate shortage of soldiers in the Confederacy.  Indeed, 
historian Bruce Catton is right when he states, “here was 
the final confession that the foundations upon which the 
Confederacy had been built were being destroyed.”15 
As early as June of 1864, Lee told General Jubal 
Early, that, “we must destroy this army of Grant’s before 
it gets to [the] James River.  If he gets there, it will 
become a siege and then it will be a mere question of 
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time.”16  By early spring of 1865, Lee realized that it was 
just a matter of time before Grant’s forces would envelop 
his army.  In a letter dated 22 February 1865, Lee wrote to 
the newly appointed Secretary of War, John C. Breckinridge, 
“Grant, I think, is now preparing to draw out by his left 
with the intention of enveloping me.  He may wait till his 
other columns approach nearer, or he may be preparing to 
anticipate my withdrawal.”17  On 4 March, Lee informed 
President Davis that it was not if, but when he would have 
to abandon the defenses.18    
On 25 March, Lee attempted to retake the initiative 
and relieve the pressure on his lines by attacking the 
extreme right of the Federal defenses southeast of 
Petersburg.  At the recommendation of General John B. 
Gordon, Lee ordered a daring night assault on Union held 
Fort Stedman.19  Gordon’s men, wielding axes and marked by 
white scarves to prevent fratricide during the close 
quarters night fighting, successfully infiltrated Federal 
pickets and were initially successful in taking the fort.20  
However, the weakness of the Confederate forces proved a 
fatal factor when Lee was unable to support Gordon’s 
breakthrough of the Union lines.21  Gordon acknowledged that 
the assault was the “last supreme effort to break the hold 
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of General Grant. . . . [and] was the expiring struggle of 
the Confederate giant, whose strength was nearly exhausted 
and whose limbs were heavily shackled by the most onerous 
conditions.”22  Lee might not have shown his men that defeat 
was inevitable, but his sons, upon seeing him riding back 
to headquarters from the failed assault, noticed “the 
sadness of his face.”23  For Lee knew that his last valiant, 
but desperate effort to break the Union siege had failed 
and that any further delay in his retreat from the area of 
operations meant certain defeat and capture of his beloved 
Army of Northern Virginia.  On 26 March, Lee wrote to Davis 
stating that the attack on Fort Stedman had failed and he 
did not “deem it prudent that this army should maintain its 
position until [Sherman] shall approach too near.”24 
Unlike his Confederate counterpart, who was unable to 
regain the units he sent south, Grant got a refreshing 
reinforcement in both leadership and mobility when General 
Philip Sheridan’s Army of Shenandoah returned to the 
Richmond-Petersburg area of operations.25  Most notably, 
Sheridan brought with him a cavalry corps that would be 
instrumental in the following month.  Grant used this to 
his advantage by ordering Sheridan to attack on 29 March, 
in the area of Five Forks. By taking control of the South 
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Side Railroad Grant cut off Lee’s final line of supply into 
Petersburg.26  A combination of Union resolve and failures 
in Confederate leadership led to a Union tactical victory.  
Sheridan, with a clear understanding of his commander’s 
intent, pushed both his cavalry and the supporting infantry 
relentlessly, not only to cut the Confederate supply lines, 
but also to capture as many Confederates as he could during 
the two days of fighting.  The Union victory forced Lee to 
abandon his lines.  His only hope was to attempt to link up 
with Joe Johnston’s Army of Tennessee in order to combat 
General Grant’s armies one at a time to level the numerical 
superiority the Union had over the Confederacy.27   
  After retreating from Richmond and Petersburg, Lee 
marched his army day and night through thick muddy 
backcountry Virginia roads in an attempt to reach Danville, 
Virginia, where he could then move south to link up with 
Johnston’s army.  Union forces reached Jetersville first, 
blocking Lee’s route to Danville, forcing him to change his 
march objective to Lynchburg.  Repeated flanking attacks by 
Federal cavalry and constant rear guard pressure from Union 
infantry caused Lee’s forces to spread out so far on the 
retreat that the once grand Southern corps failed to 
support each other and Union cavalry and infantry attrited 
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or destroyed them piecemeal in three separate engagements, 
collectively known as Sailor’s Creek. 
   Despite the extreme conditions, tenacious fighting, 
large capture of both soldiers and leaders, and the direct 
effect that Sailor’s Creek brought to the dissolution of 
the Confederacy, the events of 6 April have received little 
scholarly attention in the 50,000 volumes and thousands of 
articles that have been written on the Civil War.  Works 
dealing with the Appomattox Campaign devote anywhere from a 
couple of pages to a chapter in describing the battle.  
Most of these books give a limited description of the 
events that unfolded that day and mainly focus on the human 
drama of the battle.  The authors write about the 
desperation of the half-starved Confederate soldiers who 
fought doggedly along that swampy river constantly 
referring to the day as “Black Thursday” or “Black day of 
the Army.”28                                  
Two books and three modern magazine articles have been 
written on the battle.  The first article is by retired 
Colonel Joseph B. Mitchell, author of Decisive Battles in 
the Civil War, entitled “Sayler’s Creek.”  Mitchell seems 
to be the first historian to give credit to the Union 
troops for catching Lee’s army and posits that if Gordon 
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had not chosen an alternate route he would have experienced 
the same fate as Ewell’s Corps.  Mitchell concludes that if 
it had not been Sailor’s Creek, a crushing blow would have 
happened somewhere else along the route of retreat.29  The 
second article, “Hurtling Toward the End,” written by Chris 
Calkins is the first to identify the three different 
engagements around Sailor’s Creek as all part of the same 
battle.  Mitchell neglects the Marshall’s Crossroads 
engagement even though it was less than a mile from the 
creek and a critical factor in Ewell’s surrender.  Calkins 
argues that Sailor’s Creek “Shattered [Lee’s] force beyond 
repair.”30  The third article, “Black Thursday for Rebels,” 
by Gary Glynn, glorifies the rebel fight and fails to give 
proper credit to Union leadership.  In referring to Grant 
and General George Gordon Meade, Glynn argues, “neither man 
had much influence on unfolding events.”31  All three 
authors limited themselves to narration with little 
analysis.  
Most literature on the Appomattox campaign depicts the 
valiant efforts of the smaller Confederate force against 
overwhelming Union superiority in manpower and equipment.  
The Southern Historical Society, led by Confederate General 
Jubal Early, the first president of the organization, set 
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the tone for writings on the Civil War.32 Early, unlike many 
of his comrades in arms, never seemed to accept the 
Confederacy’s defeat.  Historian William Marvel points out 
that the initial impetus for such historiography came from 
the Southern Confederate historian Edward A. Pollard.33  In 
his book, The Lost Cause, Pollard depicts the heroic 
struggle of Confederate perseverance and courage against 
the Union’s overwhelming force.34  By concentrating on 
Confederate memoirs and not analyzing the facts, many 
historians have fallen into the trap of failing to point 
out weaknesses in the Confederate efforts.  Marvel argues 
that this comes from “the perceived infallibility of Lee.”35   
The first to question earlier myths was Chris Calkins who 
by searching the ground and researching the parole records 
has more accurately listed Confederate numbers as well as 
reduced the importance of the repeating rifle used against 
Lee’s forces as a critical factor to their success.36    
Two authors have published books dedicated to the 
topic.  Greg Eanes argues that the “defeat of the 
Confederate Army of Northern Virginia at . . . Sailor’s 
Creek hastened the end of the war.”37  Eanes uses quotations 
ranging from Confederate privates to General Lee to support 
his thesis.  His book provides a good narrative summary of 
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the battles at Sailor’s Creek.  Even though he cites 
limited Union primary sources and appears objective in his 
analysis, he is neither critical of Confederate failures 
nor does he give credit to Northern commanders for their 
successes.  He glorifies the Confederate soldiers in the 
battle and virtually ignores the efforts of those Union 
soldiers who fought with tenacity and courage that day.  
Identifying his leanings up front, Eanes starts out his 
work with a poem that reads, “The Confederate Soldiers were 
our kinfolk and our heroes” and “We commemorate their valor 
and devotion.”38  He also fails to point out known mistakes 
and exaggerations in some of the Confederate reports.  Most 
of his mistakes in this area come from citing Confederate 
memoirs that discuss force ratio numbers.  Eanes attempts 
to evaluate the battle using the principles of war, but 
confuses military terms like objective, task and mass in 
his analysis.   
More recently, journalist Derek Smith wrote Lee’s Last 
Stand: Sailor’s Creek Virginia, 1865.  Smith writes a 
balanced account of the battle that adds some features that 
Eanes did not include.  Smith’s thesis is that the Battle 
of Sailor’s Creek, despite being overlooked by many Civil 
War historians, was “the coup de grace to General Robert E. 
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Lee’s Rebel army, setting it on a virtual funeral 
procession to Appomattox Court House where Lee surrendered 
three days later.”39  Despite several new accounts that 
Smith adds to his description of the battle that Eanes left 
out, the journalist provides little analysis of the battle 
or the events leading up to it.     
Two other authors wrote notable accounts.  Burke Davis 
in To Appomattox: Nine Days in April presents the most 
evocative description of not only the battle, but also the 
impoverished and morose conditions facing both the soldiers 
and citizens of Richmond and Petersburg.40  Despite his 
unmatched writing skills, there is no analysis of the 
conditions.  Instead, Davis chose to tell a story of the 
events.  Only one author, William Marvel, in Lee’s Last 
Retreat, has attacked the historiography on the Appomattox 
Campaign, but even he fails to give appropriate credit to 
the audacity, vision and leadership abilities of Union 
officers for their victory at Sailor’s Creek. 
  Starting with Charles Ramsdell’s presentation at the 
American Historical Association in 1924, many authors have 
written about morale within the Confederacy being a 
critical factor in ending the war.41  In 1937, Charles 
Wesley followed Ramsdell’s lead and argued that the 
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“turning points in Southern morale” started in 1863.  He 
continued, “the last six months of the Confederacy, so far 
as the populace was concerned, were a sham.  The will to 
fight had been broken.”42  Richard E. Beringer, Herman 
Hattaway, Archer Jones, and William Still Jr., also address 
this phenomenon in their book The Why the South Lost the 
Civil War.  They argue that, “the defeats, shortages, 
reduced standard of living, and change of war goals, as 
well as the war’s length . . . . placed a severe strain on 
the Confederates’ dedication to their cause.”43  They 
contend that in the end, the Confederate soldiers “did not 
want an independent Confederacy badly enough to continue 
the struggle, and they placed the welfare of their loved 
ones ahead of the creation of a new nation.44  An 
examination of the effects of the morale of the men based 
on both imminent battlefield dangers and the lack of 
support from their home front will factor into the overall 
analysis of the battle.   
Although biographers have contributed to the 
historiography of the Appomattox Campaign, the work of 
Douglas Southall Freeman on Robert E. Lee has by far the 
most detailed account of the campaign and even more 
importantly attempts to analyze the psyche of Lee in those 
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final days of the Confederacy.  Through Lee’s discussions 
with subordinate leaders and his dispatches to the 
Confederate President and the War Department, Freeman 
depicts Lee’s consternation at realizing the inevitability 
of a difficult retreat out of the capital.  Freeman also 
gives detailed analysis of the Confederate resupply fiasco 
at Amelia Court House.  Like most other biographers, 
however, Freeman adheres closely to the viewpoint of Lee 
and therefore, he leaves out details about Union decisions 
and even subordinate Confederate decisions.45    
One other author, although he did not write on 
Sailor’s Creek, accurately points out the impetus behind 
the lopsided Union Victory.  Russell Weigley, in his book 
The American Way of War, argues that “the Civil War tended 
to fix the American image of war,” in that “the complete 
overthrow of the enemy, the desertion of his military 
power, is the object of war.”46  Although criticized by 
historian Brian Linn for attempting to cover all post Civil 
War American wars under the general definition of 
“annihilation,” Weigley’s thesis is still significant in 
understanding Grant’s strategy, which in turn led to the 
Battle of Sailor’s Creek.47  Weigley, in describing the 
Shenandoah Campaign, states that Grant instructed Sheridan 
 16 
“to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to his 
death.”48  Despite the fact that the Shenandoah Campaign 
depicts Grant’s strategy executed brilliantly by Sheridan, 
the outcome came not from a constant assault of Union 
forces, but from a failed attack by Jubal Early’s forces at 
Cedar Creek.49  One can find a better example of Grant’s 
strategy of annihilation in the Appomattox Campaign where 
the apex of the successful strategy occurred at Sailor’s 
Creek.   
 This thesis will take a fresh look at the Battle of 
Sailor’s Creek, examining the multiple factors that led to 
such a lopsided result.  In studying any battle, there are 
always predicating factors that are necessary to identify 
if one hopes get a full understanding.  Leadership, morale 
of the men, support from the home front, supply, and 
reinforcement of the fighting units are all significant 
factors in determining the reasons for success or failure 
of a particular unit in combat.   Official reports, 
messages, correspondence, and other documents of the most 
significant officers are the critical sources.  These can 
be found mainly in the Official Records of the War of the 
Rebellion.  They are supplemented from several other edited 
collections of documents and letters and materials from the 
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National Archives.  Memoirs, while often self serving of 
the authors, also form a key set of references.  Many of 
the veterans on both sides left significant memoirs and 
recollections.  Selected newspapers of 1865 will provide 
contemporary flavor.  Several collections were consulted at 
the Virginia Historical Society, yielding some helpful 
details.  A wide variety of biographies and other secondary 
works will be used to assist in evaluating the leaders and 
morale of both armies.  
This thesis will address a number of questions.  What 
key factors led to the capture of so many of the 
Confederate forces at Sailor’s Creek?  What leadership 
failures and successes where important in determining the 
outcome of the battle?  Why was General John B. Gordon’s 
Corps, decimated after the earlier assault on Fort Stedman, 
and assigned to conduct a rear guard action the entire day, 
able to escape capture while Union forces were able to 
virtually annihilate General Anderson’s Corps and 
completely capture General Ewell’s Corps?  What Union 
factors led to an unprecedented increased morale and 
audacity to chase down and capture the fleeing Confederate 
Army?   Does Russell Weigley’s thesis help explain the 
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Union tactical outcome of the battle based on the strategic 
importance of destroying their enemy?    
 This study will begin with an initial examination of 
the main leaders on both sides.  This foundation will give 
the reader a clear understanding of the leaders who played 
a significant role.  After examining officers on both 
sides, the conditions within Richmond that factored into 
the morale of the leaders and the soldiers will be 
considered.  I will analyze the events leading up to the 
battle beginning with the Battle of Five Forks on 1 April 
1865.  That battle turned Lee’s flank and cut his supply 
lines into the two cities of Richmond and Petersburg, 
forcing him to abandon his fixed defenses and retreat 
towards Danville.  This was his army’s last movement and 
several of the events along the way were critical in the 
development and outcome of the battle that took place at 
Sailor’s Creek five days later.  The actions of the 
selected leaders during the three different engagements 
will be discussed.  The conclusion of this thesis will sum 
up the critical factors that led to Union victory. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONTRASTS IN COMMAND 
 
When trying to motivate their men before a mission, 
brigade and division commanders often tell them that 
“generals don’t win wars, but they can lose them.  It is 
the men on the ground fighting the battle who win the war.”  
However true that is, the general has to get many things 
right in order to ensure the opportunity for victory, not 
least of which is to motivate his men to fight.  Field 
Manual 22-100, the Army leadership guide, gives historical 
examples of leadership in trying situations.  From the 
Civil War it cites only one case, that of Colonel Joshua 
Chamberlain inspiring his men to make a determined stand on 
Little Round Top during the Battle of Gettysburg.1   In the 
same chapter that depicts Chamberlain’s heroics, leadership 
is defined as the art of “influencing people--by providing 
purpose, direction and motivation.”2  Understanding this 
definition, one can evaluate aspects of the leadership of 
both armies during the events leading up to the Battle of 
Sailor’s Creek and during the engagement itself.   
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Besides motivating their men, combat leaders also have 
to take into consideration the principles of war.  These 
principles include Objective, Offensive, Mass, Economy of 
Force, Maneuver, Unity of Command, Security, Surprise and 
Simplicity, all factors that date back to Sun Tzu, and were 
deduced by Henri Jomini from his study of Frederick the 
Great and from his experience fighting with Napoleon 
Bonaparte.3  Denis Hart Mahan studied these principles in 
France and returned to teach them at the United States 
Military Academy, where he served as a professor of 
engineering from 1832 to 1871.  Mahan taught cadets the art 
of war based on Jomini’s studies and published a book, 
Outpost, to provide further instruction in military art.4  
Many Civil War generals were “greatly influenced” by 
Mahan’s instruction.5  Ulysses S. Grant, who graduated in 
1843, took Mahan’s class entitled “Engineering and the 
Science of War.”6  Although Robert E. Lee graduated in 
1829, before Mahan had started teaching at West Point, Lee 
may have been influenced by Mahan when Lee returned to the 
academy to serve as superintendent from 1852-1855.  
Historian Donald D. Chipman credits Lee’s knowledge of 
Jomini’s principles for Lee’s success at Chancellorsville.7  
If fact, by the end of the war even the readers of the 
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Richmond newspapers knew of Jomini’s principles.  In a 
letter to the editor of the Richmond Dispatch, the 
contributor argued that academy-trained commanders where 
superior to volunteer commanders because of their knowledge 
of the principles of war.8  Regardless of how they learned 
the basic principles of war, Grant and Lee were familiar 
with them, thus the degree to which each adhered to them 
provides a measure by which to evaluate both leaders and 
their subordinates’ actions during the Appomattox Campaign 
and the Battle of Sailor’s Creek.     
In addition to the training and motivational abilities 
of the leaders involved at Sailor’s Creek, another element 
of command was crucial in defining what historian T. Harry 
Williams labels as a critical trait in his study of Civil 
War generals--character.  The level of command experience 
and the outcome of battles previously participated in 
contribute to defining the character of a commander.9  The 
best Civil War generals possessed the ability to fight and 
win not only when the conditions are advantageous, but when 
they were the underdog as well.  Therefore it is important 
to examine those leaders’ experiences up to Sailor’s Creek 
in order to better assess their actions in the battle 
itself.    
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As introduced in Chapter 1, the common reasons given 
for the Confederate defeat in the Civil War relate to 
factors other than leadership:  most importantly the 
overwhelming strength in numbers of their federal 
opponents, the superiority of logistic support available to 
the Northerners, and the advantages of communications held 
by the North over the South.  For example, historian Ezra 
Warner surmises that nothing could “compensate for the 
undiminished resources and determination of the Federals, 
nor the steadily waning resources at [Lee’s] own command.”10  
Historian Gary Gallagher writes that “the Army of Northern 
Virginia. . . . finally capitulat[ed] in the face of 
overwhelming Union manpower and resources.”11  In his 
farewell to his troops, Lee laid foundation for this 
assessment when he cited the far superior strength of Union 
forces as his reason for seeking terms of capitulation.  
Lee declared in General Orders Number 9, that “the Army of 
Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to 
overwhelming numbers and resources.”12  A year later, this 
viewpoint appeared in The Lost Cause, whose author Edward 
Pollard wrote that “there is no doubt that this superiority 
in numbers had great weight,” and that “the Confederates 
have gone out of this war, with the proud, secret, 
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deathless, dangerous consciousness that they are THE BETTER 
MEN, and that there was nothing wanting but a change in a 
set of circumstances . . . . to make them the victors.”  
Pollard concluded, “but at last the unequal contest was 
terminated.”13  Although northern armies were better 
supplied and larger than their southern counterparts, 
anyone citing these as the sole decisive factors fails to 
take into account so many of Lee’s earlier victories over 
more numerous and better supplied Union foes.  
 The war developed in such a way as to bring the two 
best commanders face to face for this final epic battle.  
The old U.S. Army was small and its officers were likely to 
cross paths several times during their military careers.  
As early as the Mexican War Grant and Lee met.14  By 1864 
news of Grant’s successes out West had preceded him to the 
Eastern Theater.15  Mary Chesnut, in January 1864 wrote that 
despite Grant’s drunken ways, “He fights to win. . . . He 
is not distracted by a thousand side issues. . . . He is 
narrow and sure.”16  Newspapers tracked his progress to 
Washington as if he was a victorious army marching east to 
save the country, and he was greeted like a hero while 
stopping over in Philadelphia.17  So it is to no surprise 
that Lee understood he now faced an opponent who would not 
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only not retreat, but who would press him with the audacity 
and courage yet unseen in any of his previous counterparts 
in blue.18   In Lee, Grant saw an admirable foe, but Grant 
neither feared nor idolized Lee.  Far from believing in the 
myth of Lee’s invincibility, Grant stated that he had known 
Lee prior to the war and that he “knew he was mortal.”19 
Ironically, although Lee had been offered command of 
the Union armies prior to the war, he was not appointed 
general in chief of the Confederate armies until a year 
after Grant had been appointed to the same position in the 
Union army.20  Grant, as general in chief of all Union 
forces, placed himself at the decisive point in the 
conflict by accompanying the Army of the Potomac as it 
invaded Virginia in 1864.21  Although Grant could have 
chosen to remain out West to watch over his subordinate 
commander, in that theater, William T. Sherman, or plant 
himself in Washington as General Henry Halleck had done 
after being appointed general in chief, he chose instead to 
collocate his headquarters with that of the Army of the 
Potomac.22  Opposite this army stood the most capable 
Confederate general in command of the most feared Southern 
army.  Historian Peter Carmichael states that unlike Lee, 
Grant understood “Civil War armies were virtually 
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indestructible.”23  In fact, Grant understood his objective 
to be just that--to destroy Lee’s army. On 9 April 1864, 
Grant explained to Meade that “Lee’s army will be your 
objective point.  Wherever Lee goes there you will go 
also.”24  With such a goal the Army of the Potomac became 
Grant’s main force and he placed himself accordingly.25    
 Historiography on the Civil War has consistently 
assessed Lee to be the best commander on either side.  Only 
recently has Grant’s star started to shine while Lee’s 
reputation has started to sag.26  Ulysses S. Grant was 
indeed a surprise hero of the Civil War.  His career 
started well, but after commendable service during the 
Mexican War, Grant began drinking.  He received a warning 
from his commanding officer for his alcohol problem and 
resigned his commission.  T. Harry Williams puts it best 
when he wrote that Grant “left the army, if not under a 
cloud, certainly with mutual relief to both parties.”27   
His attempt at making a living in the civilian world 
was less than spectacular.  Having failed at multiple 
endeavors, he ended up clerking in a leather store run by 
his two brothers.28  When the Civil War started, Grant’s 
military talents could once again be put to good use.  A 
month into the war Grant wrote to the Adjutant General 
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asking for a commission, stating that he was competent to 
command a regiment.  The letter was mislaid and never acted 
on.29  As historian Bruce Catton points out, Grant might 
have withered away the war guarding trains in eastern 
Missouri had it not been for Illinois Congressman Elihu B. 
Washburne.30  Each congressman was allowed to promote one 
officer to brigadier general and Grant was from Washburne’s 
hometown of Galena, Illinois.  Having no knowledge of 
Grant’s abilities mattered not, for at least Washburne 
could show his constituents that he was working for them.31  
Through Washburne’s nomination, Grant was promoted to 
brigadier general and put in command of the military 
district of southeastern Missouri, headquartered in Cairo, 
Illinois.32   
 Though far from the center of the war, Grant used his 
commands out West to their fullest.  Successes at Forts 
Henry and Donelson and his stunning victories at Vicksburg 
and Chattanooga proved he was the best Union commander.  
After Congress authorized his promotion to the rank of 
Lieutenant General, Grant came east to prove he was the 
best commander on both sides of the conflict.  Unlike Lee, 
Grant was not cheered everywhere he went.  In fact, T. 
Harry Williams points out that, “only once is it recorded 
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that the men cheered him.”33  After suffering a loss during 
the Wilderness Campaign, Grant had turned his army south, 
towards the enemy instead of retreating toward the federal 
capital as his predecessors had when their initial 
endeavors were checked.  Union soldiers were so used to 
retreating after engaging the revered Army of Northern 
Virginia, that when they realized they had a leader who 
would press the fight home against the Confederate forces 
they cheered the Lieutenant General as he passed by.34    
One can only imagine the consternation Meade must have 
felt upon Grant’s promotion to lieutenant general.  By the 
time General Grant had taken command, General Meade, a West 
Point graduate of 1835, had been in command of the Army of 
the Potomac for almost a year.  Although Meade had 
adequately fought as a corps commander in the Federal 
defeat at Chancellorsville, his most able performance was 
within a few days of his assuming command of the Army of 
the Potomac.  But, even his victory in one of the epic 
battles of the Civil War would be stained with criticism.  
After he soundly defeated General Lee’s army at Gettysburg 
in July 1863, Meade let the Army of Northern Virginia 
escape back across the Potomac and Rappahannock Rivers 
without any attempt to catch and destroy it.  Lincoln, 
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distraught over the missed opportunity to annihilate Lee’s 
Army had written, but never sent a letter admonishing Meade 
for failing to follow up his victory at Gettysburg.35  After 
receiving criticism from Washington on the missed 
opportunity, Meade offered his resignation, but at least 
initially Lincoln was reluctant to fire the hero of 
Gettysburg who drove the enemy from his home state.  
Instead Meade was promoted to brigadier general in the 
regular army and offered thanks in the form of a 
congressional resolution for defending Pennsylvania from 
the invading army.36   
Meade failed to brighten his star during the rest of 
the year, and if anything fell further from favor after the 
failed Mine Run Campaign of that November.37  Realizing 
Lee’s fortifications were too strong, Meade, instead of 
attacking, withdrew back to Union lines for the rest of the 
winter.  The following spring Grant was promoted.  Even 
prior to Grant’s arrival in the East, Meade worried about 
being outdone by the man from the West, fearing that Grant 
would be given more resources to use against the enemy, 
with them achieve success, and therefore look that much 
better the commander for having achieved success against 
Lee.38   
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Although their first meeting was amicable enough, 
several pressures soon created fissures within their 
professional relationship, driving Meade to the edge of 
envy and disgust.  The New York Times reported that Grant’s 
newly appointed chief of staff, Major General W. F. Smith, 
would now direct “whoever maybe nominally in command of the 
Army of the Potomac.”39  Despite that both Meade and Grant’s 
headquarters were in the same vicinity, of Culpepper, 
Virginia, newspaper headlines read that Grant was eight 
miles closer to the enemy than Meade was.40  It also seemed 
that any blunder or setback on the part of the Army of the 
Potomac was attributed to Meade, but any successes were 
credited to Grant’s close supervision and leadership over 
the Army of the Potomac.41  The final straw came when both 
Philip Sheridan, who had been junior to Meade, and Sherman 
were promoted to the rank of major general in the regular 
army ahead of Meade.  Meade believed that Grant was showing 
favoritism to his boys from out West and demanded justice.  
Lincoln saw to Meade’s orders being adjusted so that he 
outranked Sheridan and thus possibly averted Meade’s 
resignation.   
In the end, Grant and Meade were able to work together 
effectively.  General Rufus Ingalls was probably most 
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prophetic when he told Grant that with his close 
supervision over Meade, Grant “couldn’t have a better man 
than Meade.”42  Meade showed during the Appomattox Campaign, 
even while very sick, that although not as aggressive a 
combat commander as Sheridan, he would execute Grant’s 
orders to the best of his abilities.     
Described by historian Clarence Macartney as “a tonic 
for Grant’s soul,” Major General Philip Sheridan possessed 
the ability to inspire confidence in both his commanders 
and subordinates alike.43  Sheridan proved not only a 
capable combat commander, but had a unique relationship 
with Grant.  Grant knew that he had a fighter in Sheridan 
and the subordinate not only trusted in Grant’s abilities, 
but drew strength from them.   
Grant’s most able lieutenant, Philip Sheridan was 
lucky to be in the army at all.  Unlike Grant, who never 
dreamed of military greatness, Sheridan, motivated by the 
Mexican War, read military history in his leisure time 
prior to attending the U.S. Military Academy.44  Hot 
tempered and not apt to follow orders from those he did not 
respect, Cadet Sheridan was suspended from the academy for 
attacking an upperclassmen.  First he had lunged “at an 
upperclassman with a bayoneted rifle,” then he later beat 
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Cadet Sergeant William R. Terrill, with his fists prior to 
being suspended.45  The Commandant, taking into account 
Sheridan’s good conduct prior to the incident, suspended 
Sheridan for one year instead of expelling him.46  Sheridan 
returned to West Point and graduated in the middle of his 
class.  He was commissioned into the infantry and sent to 
the West until the beginning of the Civil War.  As a 
captain Sheridan held only an administrative position until 
he was able to maneuver into command of a regiment of 
cavalry in 1862.47  
It was during his short stint as a regimental 
commander that Sheridan formed his first and not so 
flattering impression on the future general in chief.  
After being ordered to reinforce General Don Carlos Buell 
in Louisville, Sheridan was confronted by Grant, who stated 
that he did not want Sheridan’s regiment to be sent.  
Anticipating that Kentucky would be where the action was, 
Sheridan told Grant that he wished to go.  Grant had later 
recalled that Sheridan’s answer was so “brusque and rough,” 
that “I don’t think Sheridan could have said anything that 
could have made a worse impression upon me.”48 Shortly 
afterward, Sheridan assumed command of a brigade of cavalry 
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and first saw combat during a successful raid on Boonville, 
Mississippi.   
By October 1862, Sheridan was a brigadier general in 
command of an infantry division.  While fighting under 
General Buell at Perryville, Kentucky, Sheridan showed a 
characteristic similar to General George S. Patton during 
World War II.  During the heat of the battle General Buell 
rode up to Sheridan’s command and heard the redheaded 
Irishman cursing up a storm.  When Buell warned him about 
where he might be eternally heading that day, Sheridan 
declared, “we must hold this point and my men won’t think 
I’m in earnest unless I swear at them like hell.”49  Within 
a couple of months, after being cited for gallantry at the 
Battle of Stones River, Sheridan pinned on the rank of 
major general of volunteers.50   
At Grant’s request Sheridan was transferred to the 
East and placed in command of the Union cavalry.  Grant 
realized, despite the profane officer’s rough edges that he 
was a fighter through and through.  Although Secretary of 
War Edwin Stanton and President Lincoln were not impressed 
when they met Sheridan, who stood only five feet, five 
inches tall and weighed 115 pounds, Grant had no doubt in 
his abilities.  When visiting the War Department shortly 
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after Sheridan’s meeting with Stanton, Grant was asked 
whether the “little fellow [could] handle your cavalry.” 
Grant replied “You will find him big enough for the purpose 
before we get through with him.”51  It was rather fortunate 
for the Union that Grant did have supreme confidence in 
Sheridan because within a short period of time the little 
fighter would once again nearly alienate another superior.  
 As commander of the cavalry of the Army of the 
Potomac, Sheridan reported to Major General George Meade.  
Sheridan, following Grant’s intentions of reform, wanted to 
turn the Union cavalry into an effective fighting force, 
conducting raids and used as a highly mobile striking 
force, while Meade felt more comfortable with his cavalry 
performing the traditional role of screening, scouting and 
guarding lines of communications and his flanks.  During 
the Wilderness Campaign Meade had countermanded Sheridan’s 
orders and, without consulting Sheridan, ordered his 
cavalry to carry out different orders.  During the battle 
the cavalry got intermingled with the infantry and Meade 
blamed the cavalry for blocking the roads that the infantry 
were supposed to use.  Sheridan snapped back that if that 
were true, Meade was to blame since he bypassed Sheridan’s 
command and he “could henceforth command the Cavalry Corps 
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himself.”52  When Meade went to complain to Grant about 
Sheridan’s insubordination, he mentioned the cavalry 
commander’s boast about being able to whip Confederate 
cavalry commander J.E.B Stuart.53  Grant replied, “Well he 
generally knows what he is talking about.  Let him go out 
and do it.”54  The next day Sheridan went out and did just 
that.  During his famous raid on Richmond, Sheridan’s 
cavalry not only defeated Stuart’s vaunted cavalry, but 
mortally wounded Stuart as well.55   
Through these actions Sheridan built a strong esprit 
de corps among his cavalry that served the Union well in 
the final days of the war.  Grant again called on his most 
able fighter to destroy Confederate Jubal Early’s army when 
it threatened Washington from the Shenandoah Valley in the 
fall of 1864.  After soundly defeating Early at Winchester, 
Virginia, in September of 1864 and during a return trip 
from Washington, Sheridan raced twenty miles across the 
valley in order to rally his routed Army of Shenandoah 
against a surprise attack by Early at Cedar Creek.  With 
Sheridan’s reputation as a combat commander solidified to 
both the country and to Grant, the general in chief would 
call on his little cavalryman to make a star appearance in 
the final show of the war in the East.  
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Sheridan was the instrument Grant used to force Lee’s 
retreat from Richmond and was the anvil Grant used in which 
he smashed a major portion of Lee’s army up against, with 
II and VI Corps being the hammer, several days later.  
After the war Grant, always willing to heap praise on his 
subordinates, said of Sheridan: “He belongs to the first 
rank of soldiers, not only of our country but of the world.  
I rank Sheridan with Napoleon and Frederick and the great 
commanders of history.”56 
 Within Meade’s command two corps commanders would lead 
their men in the fight against Lee’s forces at Sailor’s 
Creek.  Major General Horatio Wright graduated from West 
Point in 1841, two years prior to Grant.  Virginia state 
forces captured Wright early in the war, but later released 
him, and in September 1861, he was promoted to brigadier 
general of volunteers.  In February 1862 he led an 
independent, but inconclusive expedition against the 
Florida coast and followed that up by commanding a Union 
division in the battle of Secessionville, South Carolina.  
Wright commanded a division in VI Corps at Gettysburg, and 
when the VI Corps commander, Major General John Sedgwick, 
was killed during the Wilderness Campaign in the spring of 
1864, Wright took over the corps.  Sheridan specifically 
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requested Wright’s Corps for the attack on Five Forks in 
April 1865, even though Wright had failed to rally his 
routed troops at Cedar Creek, Virginia, the previous year 
while serving under command of Sheridan.  On that occasion, 
Sheridan rallied the Union forces and defeated Early’s 
army.57  The fact that Sheridan retained faith in Wright 
despite this, proved vital to the success of Union forces 
at the Battle of Sailor’s Creek.   
 Another important Federal leader, Major General Andrew 
Humphreys, graduated West Point in 1831 and prior to the 
beginning of the war, spent most of his time conducting 
hydrological studies of the Mississippi Delta Region.  He 
started out the war as an aide to Major General George 
McClellan then after being promoted to brigadier general of 
volunteers in April 1862, became chief topographical 
engineer of the Army of the Potomac.  Like Wright, Humpheys 
commanded a division at Gettysburg before serving briefly 
as Meade’s chief of staff.  When the wounds sustained by 
Winfield Hancock at Gettysburg forced his retirement as a 
corps commander, Humphreys took over command of Hancock’s 
Corps, and stayed at that position until the end of the 
war.58 
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Major General Wesley Merritt, commander of Sheridan’s 
cavalry corps, was of little importance during the battle, 
but two of his subordinate division commanders played key 
roles.  Generals George Armstrong Custer and George Crook  
were instrumental in stopping two of Lee’s corps that day.   
George Armstrong Custer, like George Pickett, was one of 
the most colorful figures to emerge from the Civil War.  
After graduating last in his class in 1861 from West Point 
he was ordered to the Army of the Potomac where he served 
as a dispatch runner during the Battle of First Manassas.  
By June of 1863, after distinguishing himself over a dozen 
times Custer was promoted from 1st lieutenant to brigadier 
general of volunteers.  From that point on he commanded and 
fought in every cavalry engagement of the Army of the 
Potomac distinguishing himself as a hard-nosed fighter.59   
Another cavalry commander who proved vital in stopping 
the Confederate army on 6 April was Brigadier General 
George Crook.  After graduating from West Point and being 
commissioned a lieutenant in the infantry in 1852, Crook 
spent the next eight years stationed in northern California 
and Washington.  During the first year of the war Crook was 
appointed served as colonel of the 36th Ohio Regiment.  In 
1863 Crook took command of a cavalry division in George H. 
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Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland.  After being promoted to 
major general of volunteers Crook was captured in one of 
the most daring Confederate raids of the war by Captain 
Jesse McNeill’s “Partisan Rangers.”  Paroled in Richmond, 
Crook returned to command a cavalry division in Sheridan’s 
cavalry corps.60 
 These Union commanders faced a group of battle-tested 
Confederate officers.  Robert E. Lee, the senior commander, 
was born in Westmoreland County, Virginia, the son of Henry 
“Light-Horse Harry” Lee, hero in the American Revolution. 
Lee excelled at West Point and graduated in 1829 without a 
demerit posted against him.  Seventeen years later Lee was 
brevetted three times in the Mexican War up to the rank of 
colonel.  After serving as superintendent at West Point for 
three years, Lee was promoted to the regular rank of 
lieutenant colonel and took command of the 2nd Cavalry 
Regiment.   
Lee, a thirty year veteran of the army at the outbreak 
of the Civil War turned down a senior appointment in the 
Federal army, resigned his commission, and traveled to 
Richmond where he was appointed a brigadier general in the 
Confederate Army and placed in charge of all land and naval 
forces of Virginia.  After an unsuccessful foray into West 
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Virgina, Lee was assigned to act as military adviser to 
Confederate President Jefferson Davis.  When Joseph 
Johnston was wounded at the Battle of Seven Pines, General 
Lee took command of what he would refer to as the Army of 
Northern Virginia.  During the first two years of the war, 
that army would rack up victory after victory against Union 
forces causing President Lincoln to shuffle commanders in 
an attempt to get the one that could defeat General Lee.61   
If leadership is such a critical factor in war, then 
why did the man deemed by many historians to be the best 
military leader of the Civil War lose?  Historian Burton 
Hendrick posits that if the Confederate statesmen had ruled 
with the “same skill that Lee” had led his army “the result 
[of the war] might have easily been very different.”62  
Historian Burke Davis states that Lee “handled his inferior 
force as if he could literally smell out the intentions of 
the enemy.”63  Peter Carmichael offers that Lee’s “greatest 
strength . . .  was his ability to [turn] perilous 
situations into moments of opportunity.”64  What situation 
could have been more perilous given the state of Lee’s army 
retreating from the emboldened Union forces chasing after 
them as they left the Richmond and Petersburg siege lines?  
Yet for some reason Lee’s vaunted leadership was unable to 
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turn the tide like it had done at Second Manassas, 
Chancellorsville, Fredericksburg, or the Seven Days 
battles.   
Some writers blame Lee’s limited and inefficient staff 
system for logistical difficulties throughout the war.65  
Historian Robert E. L. Krick in his book, Staff Officers in 
Gray, shows that Lee had requested several times that the 
Confederate Congress establish a General Staff to improve 
the efficiency of the support elements within the 
Confederate Army.  With the exception of the ordnance 
officers, most officers viewed staff assignments with 
ridicule and disdain, and therefore the Confederate staff 
system might not have been manned by the best of the 
Confederacy.66  One can conclude, after examining the 
results of the Appomattox Campaign, that Lee’s logistical 
support was at best, inefficient.  However, it was not the 
first example in the Civil War in which the Confederate 
supplies were meager.  When invading Pennsylvania in 1863, 
the Army of Northern Virginia relied heavily on forage from 
the countryside.  By the Battle of Cold Harbor in 1864, 
Confederate soldiers faced starvation and resorted to 
extreme measures, like scraping Yankee blood off crackers 
in order to survive.67  One must look beyond Lee’s 
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inadequate staff and lack of logistical support, and focus 
on the conditions that faced the Army of Northern Virginia 
by 1865, on Lee’s subordinate commanders, and on how they 
reacted to those conditions.   
 One of the senior Confederate commanders taking part 
at Sailor’s Creek was Lieutenant General Richard Stoddert 
Ewell, an 1840 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy who, 
prior to the Civil War, spent twenty years serving in the 
Southwest, earning a brevet promotion for gallantry in the 
Mexican War.  At the start of the Civil War Ewell resigned 
his commission in the U.S. Army and accepted one as a 
brigadier general in the Confederate Provisional Army.  
When Lee lost Thomas “Stonewall” Jackson, the officer that 
he called his “right arm,” at Chancellorsville, Lee 
selected Ewell to take command of the irreplaceable 
Jackson’s 2nd Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.68  
Having lost a leg in the Manassas Campaign, some say Ewell 
also lost some of his nerve.  At Gettysburg he proved he 
was a lesser commander than Jackson when he failed to order 
his men to take Cemetery Hill and what would become the 
right flank of the nearly impenetrable Union defensive 
positions.69  Lee stated it was  due to health reasons 
caused by the loss of Ewell’s leg that kept him from 
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undergoing “the arduous duties of a Corps Comm[ander]” when 
he wrote to President Davis in June 1864.70  He recommended 
to the Adjutant General, General Samuel Cooper, that Ewell 
be given command of the defenses of Richmond, no doubt to 
relieve some of the sting of the relief of command.71  After 
the war Lee would recount that had he still had “Stonewall” 
Jackson, Gettysburg would have been another victory for the 
Confederacy.  Lee confided that “Ewell was a fine officer, 
but would never take responsibility for exceeding his 
orders and having been ordered to Gettysburg, he would not 
go farther and hold the heights beyond the town.”72   
One can imagine the distress that came over Lee during 
his retreat from Richmond, when the commander he decided 
was ill-suited for field command played a critical role in 
the final hours of the war.  Although he had been the rear 
guard commander as Lee’s forces withdrew from Gettysburg, 
Ewell did not face the persistent attack then from Union 
forces that he would face when retreating through the 
Virginia countryside almost two years later.73                                             
 Lee’s eldest son played a critical role at Sailor’s 
Creek.  Born in September, 1832, at Fortress Monroe, 
Virginia, George Washington Custis Lee graduated at the 
head of his West Point class in 1854.  Prior to the Civil 
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War, Custis served in various engineering jobs, and in 
1861, he resigned his commission in the Federal army, and 
became a captain in the Confederate army.  Custis Lee was 
an unlikely effective combat leader during the battle.  
Unlike other Confederate commanders he did not have the 
combat experience often critical to becoming an effective 
battlefield leader.  Throughout the war Custis served on 
the staff of President Davis and never saw combat until the 
last couple of months of the war.  As the Confederate 
manpower reached critically low levels near the end of the 
war, Custis Lee was promoted to major general and ordered 
to organize clerks and mechanics within Richmond into a 
fighting force to help defend the city.  During the retreat 
out of Richmond he led an understrength hodgepodge division 
under Ewell.  While commanding the Confederate left flank, 
above the tributary, Little Sailor’s Creek, at the 
engagement near Hillsman House, Custis, not used to defeat 
like his fellow officers were, fought on after Ewell had 
already surrendered the corps.74 
Fighting along side Custis Lee, General Joseph Brevard 
Kershaw commanded one of Longstreet’s divisions.  Kershaw 
did not attend West Point but did take part in the Mexican 
War as a lieutenant in the Palmetto Regiment.  Although 
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Kershaw did not attend college he did study law and passed 
the bar.  Kershaw was twice elected to the South Carolina 
legislature and was involved in the secession convention in 
1860.  Like Ewell, Kershaw was present for the artillery 
bombardment on Fort Sumter.  For the rest of the war he 
served in Longstreet’s Corps.  Although, like Grant, 
Kershaw had for a time had a problem with alcohol, but he 
overcame it and commanded one of the best brigades in the 
Confederate army.  In November 1863, Kershaw was promoted 
to command a division, a position he held until the end of 
the war.75  
By 1865 Richard H. Anderson, another key Confederate 
commander at Sailor’s Creek, stood in contrast to the 
younger Lee.  After graduating from West Point in 1842, he 
saw combat in the Mexican War and earned a brevet promotion 
to first lieutenant.76  A captain in the 2nd Dragoons in 
1861, he like many of his counterparts, resigned from the 
U.S. Army to join the Confederacy.77  Commissioned a major 
of infantry, Anderson was present during the shelling of 
Fort Sumter, and after being promoted to brigadier general, 
he succeeded General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard in 
the command at Charleston, South Carolina.78  In 1862, 
Anderson was assigned to Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, 
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and commanded at the brigade and division level in General 
James Longstreet’s Corps.79  Anderson stopped the Federal 
advance at Williamsburg and won Lee’s commendation for his 
actions at Gaines’ Mill.80  He eventually commanded the 
corps for a short time while Longstreet recovered from 
wounds received during the Wilderness Campaign.  Early on 
Lee had noted Anderson as a “capital officer” and told 
Davis that he would make a fine corps commander some day.81  
Anderson led a corps at Sailor’s Creek.  
General George E. Pickett was responsible for a 
critical piece of the Confederate defense at Sailor’s 
Creek.  Gary Gallagher states that “few Confederate 
generals enjoy a more romantic image” than Pickett.82  
Graduating last in his West Point class of 1846, Pickett 
was brevetted twice during the Mexican War for gallantry.  
After the war he spent the next twelve years serving in 
frontier posts in Texas and Washington.  In July 1859, 
Captain Pickett took sixty-six men and occupied San Juan 
Island, in the waters between British Columbia and 
Washington, preventing British troops from landing on the 
island until October.  Again he was commended for “gallant 
and firm discharge of duty.”83  At the outbreak of the Civil 
War Pickett accepted a major’s commission in the 
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Confederate army and after a short time commanding a span 
of the Rappahannock River defenses he was promoted to 
brigadier general.  During the Peninsula Campaign the 
brigade he commanded put up a stubborn defense against a 
superior Union force commanded by General Joseph Hooker at 
the Battle of Seven Pines.84  After recovering from a wound 
received at the Battle of Gaines’ Mill, Pickett, now a 
major general, commanded a division in James Longstreet’s 
Corps during the invasion of Maryland.85  In fact, up until 
the Battle of Gettysburg, one could argue that Pickett’s 
leadership had been quite impressive.  Even after the fatal 
assault in which Pickett won so much fame, Lee told Pickett 
that “you and your men have covered yourself in Glory.”86  
But at Gettysburg Pickett’s division was annihilated and 
from that point forward his leadership would be found 
wanting.  After returning from the defeat at Gettysburg, 
Pickett took command of the Department of North Carolina, 
while most of his depleted division was parceled out to 
other departments within the Confederacy until only one 
brigade remained under his control.  Union raids and 
marauding bands of deserters, made it difficult for Pickett 
to maintain control over his department, and after what 
many considered a lackluster performance he was relieved of 
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command.87  Only through the loyalty of a commander to his 
subordinate commander, was Pickett able to take the field 
again.  Pickett’s old corps commander, Longstreet, restored 
him to command of a reconstituted division he had commanded 
at Gettysburg.88   Pickett, after having fought poorly at 
Five Forks on 1 April, found himself in the unenviable 
position of being detached from General Longstreet’s Corps 
and under the temporary command of General Anderson.  
Alongside Pickett, and also under the command of 
Anderson during the final campaign, was another West Point 
trained officer.  Bushrod Rust Johnson graduated from the 
Military Academy in 1840 and fought in both the Seminole 
and Mexican Wars.  In 1847 Johnson resigned his commission 
and taught at several institutions in the South.  In 1861, 
he held the rank of colonel in the Kentucky state militia 
and entered the war at that rank.  In January 1862, within 
a month of his promotion to brigadier general, he barely 
escaped capture at Fort Henry.  After occupying Fort Henry, 
Union forces under Grant took Johnson prisoner at Fort 
Donelson.  Johnson was paroled shortly afterward and at the 
battle of Shiloh, was severely wounded.  After recovering 
from his wound, Johnson led his brigade at Murfreesboro and 
Chickamauga.  In 1864 after defending Petersburg the first 
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time against General Benjamin Butler’s army, Johnson was 
promoted to major general.89  During the Battle of Sailor’s 
Creek, Johnson’s division fought alongside of Pickett’s 
division against flanking Federal cavalry.90 
By 1865 one of the most surprisingly able of Lee’s 
lieutenants was General John Brown Gordon.  Unlike Lee’s 
other corps commanders, Gordon did not attend West Point.  
Instead he attended the University of Georgia, though he 
did not graduate.  A businessman, Gordon became involved in 
developing coal mines in northwest Georgia.  When war broke 
out, Gordon was elected as a captain in the “Raccoon 
Roughs,” a volunteer infantry company from the Georgia-
Tennessee-North Carolina region, and fought bravely despite 
being wounded several times during the war.91  Douglas 
Southall Freeman concludes from his exhaustive research of 
Civil War Confederate officers that by the second year of 
the war, of Lee’s roughly one-hundred fifty regimental 
commanders, only two, Gordon and William Mahone, “added 
materially to the vigor of high command,” and were 
therefore capable to fill higher commands.92  During the 
battle of Seven Pines Gordon’s horse was shot out from 
under him, his coat was pierced by a bullet, and his own 
brother was shot through the lungs in front of him, but he 
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gallantly led his regiment forward against the Union 
forces.  By evening, 60 percent of his regiment lay dead or 
wounded on the battlefield.93  At the Battle of Gaines’ Mill 
Gordon, once again leading his 6th Alabama Regiment, 
possessed the insight in the heat of the battle to order 
his men to lie down in line and wait for the federal 
artillery and musket fire to slacken before retiring to the 
cover of the swamps.94  At Malvern Hill, Gordon assuming 
command for the weakened Robert Rodes, fought the brigade 
valiantly.95  In November 1862, he was promoted to brigadier 
general.96  Gordon fought brilliantly in the Wilderness 
Campaign and under Jubal Early in the Shenandoah Valley 
against Sheridan’s forces.  In May 1864 he was promoted to 
major general and during the siege of Petersburg led a 
valiant yet failed assault on Fort Stedman in order to 
relieve pressure on Lee’s constantly extending defensive 
perimeter.97  It is no wonder that during the retreat out of 
Richmond, Lee chose Gordon to conduct the rearguard fight 
against the relentless Federal attacks.   
 The critical conclusion to be drawn from the 
assessment of generals is that in 1865 Grant led a force 
with competent and in some cases hand chosen leaders who 
had faced Lee in the past and won.  More importantly, 
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Grant’s actions since the Wilderness Campaign proved to his 
subordinate leaders and his men that he did not fear Lee.   
Grant’s soldiers were now ready and most willing to get 
after Lee and his vaunted Army of Northern Virginia.   
 Lee, on the other hand, led combat commanders who 
although they had tasted victory in battle, had more 
recently felt the sting of defeat.  They all had taken part 
in the battle of Gettysburg and by the time of the 
Appomattox Campaign had become weary from the unrelenting 
attacks from Grant’s newly revived forces.  Unlike Grant, 
who brought some of his fighters from the West, Lee lost 
several of his seasoned commanders by this time in the war.  
The loss of Thomas Jackson at Chancellorsville was 
irreplaceable, and the recent death of A.P. Hill on the 
beginning of Lee’s retreat out of Richmond and Petersburg 
meant that another seasoned corps commander was missing.  
Unlike Grant, Lee was not able to draw on successful combat 
leaders from other theaters.  Indeed, Lee had to make do 
with what he had left.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE RETREAT:  THE BEGINNING OF THE END 
 
While visiting in Richmond one afternoon Lieutenant 
John Wise, son of the Confederate Brigadier General Henry 
Alexander Wise, former governor of California, watched a 
battalion of men he called “darkeys” march through 
Richmond’s town square.  The Richmond Dispatch presupposed 
that if Lincoln stated he needed two hundred thousand Negro 
soldiers to win the war, then what if the South could field 
an army of three hundred thousand?  “According to 
[Lincoln’s] own premises . . . it will be impossible to put 
down the rebellion.”1  But many saw the measure for what it 
was—an act of desperation on the part of the Confederacy.  
Wise thought to himself, “Ah, this is but the beginning of 
the end.”2   
There were many other factors that affected the young 
lieutenant which caused him to consider such a dreadful, 
yet prophetic thought.  Conditions within the Confederate 
capital were far different than celebrations at Charleston 
four years earlier when Confederate forces bombarded Fort 
Sumter.  Shots fired in the spring of 1865 had a far 
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different meaning than those in April 1861.  They were not 
celebratory fire, but shots fired in anger, for the Union 
army had been besieging the Confederate capital since June 
of the previous year.3   
During the winter of 1864 and the spring of 1865, 
Grant slowly started to close Richmond and Petersburg off 
from the rest of the Confederacy and the rest of the world.  
Historian Emory Thomas writes in The Confederate State of 
Richmond, “Of all southern cities, Richmond felt the war’s 
privations most keenly.”4  Ordinary items became scarce yet 
demand for them did not fall.  Accordingly, the price for 
such items became unbearably expensive.  Nearing the end of 
the war, a cheap cigar in the home of tobacco cost ten 
dollars and a pull of whiskey cost five dollars.5  Mary 
Chesnut, wife of a Confederate official in Richmond, spent 
seventy-five dollars for “a little tea and sugar,” eighty-
five for some “forlorn shoes,” and as early as February 
1864, paid two-hundred and eighty dollars for twenty-four 
yards of flannel to make shirts for the soldiers.6  During 
the final winter of the war, Lieutenant Wise, making only 
one-hundred and twenty dollars a month, had to borrow money 
to pay for a new uniform coat that cost two thousand 
Confederate dollars.  A black felt hat cost him another 
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hundred dollars and a pair of boots made from his own 
leather cost another one-hundred and fifty dollars.7  
Confederate enlisted men suffered far worse.  Two soldiers 
who deserted into the Union ranks that final winter told 
their captors that they made eleven Confederate dollars a 
month and that a good meal in Petersburg cost them thirty 
six dollars.8  Inflation rocked the Confederacy, not quite 
to the level of post World War I Germany, but seriously 
enough that the most popular quip in Richmond was, “You 
take your money to market in the market basket, and bring 
home what you buy in your pocket book.”9  Not only were the 
citizens within the city strapped, but the city itself had 
run out of money.  From April 1864 through February 1865 
the city spent over 1,700,000 dollars while taking in only 
450,000 dollars in taxes.  Even after selling off almost 
one million dollars in railroad stocks, the city found 
itself bankrupt and the only way to remedy the situation 
was to increase taxes on an already strapped citizenry.10   
Although as early as January 1865, there was talk of 
ending the war, most Virginians were not optimistic of a 
peaceful conclusion which left their Confederacy intact.  
Confederate Captain D. Augustus Dickert wrote, in History 
of Kershaw’s Brigade that “Lincoln’s reelection caused the 
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South to despond of any other solution of the war than the 
bloody end.”11  Historian Alfred Grant correctly points out 
that “the growing awareness of defeat did little to lift 
the men’s spirits.  Antietam, Gettysburg, Vicksburg, 
Atlanta and Chattanooga. . . had a cumulative effect.”12  In 
January 1865, an article in the Richmond Whig stated that 
the peace proposal brought on by Francis Preston Blair was 
“nothing more than one of those tricks.”13  Josiah Gorgas, 
the Confederate Ordnance Chief, wrote on 3 February 1865 
that, “the peace commissioners probably reached Washington 
yesterday,” but “no one expects any result.”  In fact, the 
meeting took place at the placid location of Hampton Roads, 
but even the calming effect of the location did little to 
weaken Lincoln’s resolve.14  The President stated that 
nothing could be discussed until the rebellious states once 
again recognized Federal authority.  This was the one thing 
above all else that the Confederate delegation could not 
agree to and so the conference ended after some short 
discussion but no resolution on prisoner exchanges and 
property rights.15  Within days an “enthusiastic meeting on 
the war,” was held at the African Church in an attempt to 
rebuild Confederate war fervor.16  Several senior 
Confederate officials led by President Jefferson Davis gave 
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speeches condemning Lincoln for his unwillingness to 
discuss peace.17  Within days several brigades within the 
Army of Northern Virginia passed resolutions vowing to 
fight to the last man.18  However, false motivation seldom 
lasts in the face of overwhelming facts that confirm 
otherwise.  
Sherman’s march across the South provided a constant 
source of bad news for Confederacy.  On 13 December 1864 
the Richmond Dispatch stated that Sherman’s army was 
“confronted by a strong Confederate force . . . and our 
generals had . . . . expressed [that they were] fully able 
to cope with the enemy.”19  However, by 20 December the 
story was less optimistic.  “The news from Tennessee 
furnished us by the Yankee press is not of the most 
delightful and cheery.”20  The issue printed the day before 
Christmas warned against too much normal “Yule Tide” 
celebration and showed, beyond patriotic rhetoric, the true 
war weariness that Southerners were feeling.   
“Certainly this is not a time for insensate 
joy.  There is scarcely a fireside in the 
Confederacy which has not a vacant chair in the 
Christmas circle—the father, the husband, the 
brother, gone forever, or miserable captives in 
Northern prisons.  The very homes of thousands 
have disappeared from the last of the earth; 
fruitful regions transformed into deserts; 
battlefields white with bones of the unburied 
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dead; hospitals crowded with sick and dying 
countless hearts breaking with the agonies of 
late bereavement.  Or if sorrows of others cannot 
touch our sensibilities, the possibility that 
their fate may be our own should serve to chasten 
the exuberance of natures which have never known 
affliction. . . . with a vast army at our very 
doors thirsty for our destruction, and a powerful 
government preparing to strike one more and that 
a colossal blow.”21 
 
On 21 February, Josiah Gorgas wrote, “The greatest 
consternation prevails on account of the continued advance 
of Sherman.”22  That same day, after hearing that Charleston 
was evacuated and Columbia was occupied by Sherman, Samuel 
Pickens, a soldier in the 5th Alabama Infantry Regiment, 
wrote, “I trust in the Lord that his successful career will 
soon be brought to a close.”23  Also on 21 February, Lee 
notified the Confederate Secretary of War that “in the 
event of the necessity of abandoning our position . . . I 
shall endeavor to unite the corps of the army about 
Burkeville.”24  Three days later the Richmond Whig wrote 
that the “march of Sherman through South Carolina seems to 
have inspired the Yankees. . . . one would imagine the 
whole Yankee nation to be afflicted with Sherman on the 
brain” and that “The unopposed transit of a Union army 
through its hated South Carolina has raised them to quite 
an unparalleled exaltations.”25 
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As early as mid January 1865, Lee, who had turned so 
many situations around to the favor of the Confederacy in 
the past, began to lose hope.  On 29 January, he requested 
that President Davis publish an order to prepare all excess 
cotton and tobacco to be stored so that it could be burned 
easily on the approach of the Yankees.26  The following day 
he warned Davis that if Grant was reinforced, he “will be 
enabled to envelope Richmond, or turn both of our flanks.”27  
He wrote to his wife, “I pray we may not be overwhelmed, I 
shall however, endeavor to do my duty and fight to the 
last.”28  The first week of March, General John Brown Gordon 
met with Lee at his headquarters on the outskirts of 
Petersburg.  Gordon, upon entering the house, “saw a look 
of painful depression” on Lee’s face.29  With Generals James 
Longstreet and Richard Ewell too far away in Richmond and 
A. P. Hill on convalescent leave, Lee had called on Gordon 
to discuss the prospects of the war.  In reflection on that 
moment Gordon wrote, “the hour had come . . . when he could 
no longer carry alone the burden, or entirely conceal his 
forebodings of impending disaster.”30  Gordon recalled that 
after Lee shared many negative reports from across the 
army, Gordon presented three alternatives:  To settle for 
peace, to retreat from Richmond and Petersburg, or to 
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attack.31  On 2 March, Gorgas wrote “people are almost in a 
state of desperation, and but too ready to give up the 
cause. . . . there is a sentiment of hopelessness abroad.”32  
That same day Lee wrote to Grant directly seeking a meeting 
between the two, to attempt to end “the present unhappy 
difficulties” and “put an end to the calamities of war,” 
“by means of a military convention.”33   
Although Lee was forthright in his dealings with his 
wife and the Secretary of War, he did not come right out 
and tell Jefferson Davis that it was a lost cause.34  
Breckinridge, in hoping to convince Davis of the impending 
disaster, asked Lee to state to the President the “military 
condition of the country.”  Instead, General Lee wrote 
that, “while the military situation is not favorable, it is 
not worse than the superior numbers and resources of the 
enemy justified us in expecting from the beginning.”  He 
continued, “everything in my opinion has depended and still 
depends upon the disposition and feelings of the people.”35  
The question should be asked, was everyone’s trust in 
General Lee’s ability to save the Confederacy so great that 
although he knew in his heart that the position of the 
South was impossible, he was unable to admit it?    
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In December the Richmond Dispatch stated that Lincoln 
had “let the golden days of autumn slip by and winter 
cometh when no man can fight.”36  The weather in February 
and March had been particularly rainy.  The roads were in 
horrible condition, but warmer, dryer weather was just 
around the corner.  Usually an infantryman constantly 
exposed to the elements appreciates the coming of warmer, 
dryer weather, but Johnny Reb knew that as spring 
approached so did the active campaigning season.  Samuel 
Pickens of Company D, 5th Alabama Regiment noted this 
dilemma in his diary on 10 February 1865.  He wrote, “This 
is a bright mild delightful day—such a one as we used to 
hail with joy, as the welcome herald of approaching Spring.  
But now how different is it!  For we can’t enjoy pleasant 
weather, knowing that it will, in all probability, bring 
active movements & bloody collisions.”37  On 6 March, 
Brigadier General Josiah Gorgas, Chief of the Confederate 
Ordnance Department, entered in his diary that “the crisis 
of our fate is rapidly approaching, and men’s minds are 
harassed with doubts, fears & perplexity.”38   
A combination of the aforementioned factors caused 
Confederate soldiers to start abandoning their posts and 
desert their beloved army.  On 14 February, Lee wrote to 
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the new Confederate Secretary of War, John C. Breckinridge, 
to inform him of the “alarming number of desertions. . . . 
chiefly from the North Carolina regiments.”39  In one night 
thirty-seven soldiers from the 45th North Carolina Regiment 
deserted.40  Secret peace societies began to appear across 
the Confederacy and in Georgia a group of soldiers 
belonging to one of these organizations “planned to desert 
then attempt to win over the other soldiers to do likewise 
in order to end the war.”41  Lee, so concerned with the mass 
desertions, published General Orders Number 8 on 27 March 
1865.  The order declared that soldiers could not discuss 
even in jest the idea of desertion.  The penalty for 
violating the law was death.42  Despite such a stiff 
penalty, soldiers still deserted.  The dreadful conditions 
within the army were magnified by the lack of support 
soldiers received from the home front.  Samuel Pickens 
wrote that soldiers recently back from leave “give a 
deplorable account of the sentiments of the people in 
Alabama and also in Georgia and South Carolina.  Everybody 
whipped and despairing of our cause: wanting peace on any 
terms. . . . How shameful!”43   One Georgia soldier 
admitted, “I wish this war would come to a close and I 
don’t care how all I want is peace.”44  
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Besides morale and desertion problems, Lee faced the 
constant worry of being surrounded and his lines of 
communications to the rest of the Confederacy being cut.  
If Grant was able to sever Lee’s resupply lines, he could 
literally starve Lee into submission and the most powerful 
Confederate army would be no more.  As early as 21 
February, Lee warned Breckinridge that he might have to 
abandon his defenses and that he thought “Lynchburg or some 
point west, the most advantageous to remove stores from 
Richmond.”45  On 9 March, Lee told Breckinridge that if he 
could save the army in an “efficient condition” he did not 
regard the loss of the capital as “fatal to our success.”46  
On 14 March 1865 President Davis approved an act of the 
Confederate Congress “authorizing him to remove the 
archives and to assemble Congress elsewhere.”47  The failed 
attempt by Gordon on 26 March to relieve pressure on his 
extended lines might have been enough to break Lee’s 
resolve to maintain his defense of the capital.48   
On the other side, for some of the same reasons, the 
Union forces were upbeat,  confident the end was near, and 
that victory would be theirs.  Ever since Grant had taken 
command, many soldiers felt that the long and dreadful war 
would finally come to a conclusion.  As early as the summer 
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of 1864, Lieutenant James J. Hartley wrote to his wife, 
that “Richmond will be in our hands very shortly.  The 
troops are all in very good spirits. . . . I think this 
campaign is going to end the war.”  In speaking of his 
commanders, Hartley avowed that Grant “is the best general 
that has ever been over this army and Grant and Meade 
combined, the intrepidity of the one combined with the 
prudence of the other, form a combination that cannot be 
beaten.”49   
Despite the confidence of the Union troops in their 
commander, the Northern populace, like their Southern 
counterparts, was growing tired of the war.50  Grant 
understood what Lincoln had failed to impart on George C. 
McClellan; that a general at times must do something “to 
promise victory” to the people supporting the war at home.  
If not, they might “become discouraged and give up.”51  That 
coming spring he planned renewing the confidence of the 
Union’s people.   
On 26 March, Sheridan met with Grant to discuss the 
upcoming campaign.  After reading his orders, Sheridan told 
Grant of his reservations about moving south and supporting 
Sherman against Johnston in North Carolina.52  Johnston and 
Sherman had just fought at Bentonville, North Carolina, the 
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week prior and Sherman was currently marching towards 
Raleigh with Johnston following.53  Grant eased Sheridan’s 
concerns by stating that his instructions were somewhat of 
a decoy and informed the cavalry commander on what his true 
mission would be.54  Grant told his subordinate commander 
“that, as a matter of fact, I [intend] to close up the war 
right here, with this movement.”55  Sheridan spent the next 
couple of days refitting his cavalry for the upcoming 
mission.  At City Point on 28 March 1865, Grant explained 
to a worried President Lincoln aboard the paddleboat River 
Queen, “that the crisis of the war was now at hand.”56  With 
Sheridan now back from the Shenandoah, Grant planned on 
maneuvering his forces surrounding the southern side of 
Petersburg westward to “cut [Lee] off from the Carolinas.”  
Grant continued that his “only apprehension was that Lee 
might move out before him and evacuate Petersburg and 
Richmond, but if he did there would be a hot pursuit.”57   
On 29 March, Grant moved his headquarters from City 
Point to directly behind the Union lines southwest of 
Petersburg.58  That same day Sheridan started his movement 
toward Five Forks.59  The constant rain had considerably 
hindered Grant’s westward flanking movement on Lee.  
General Rawlins suggested to Grant that it might be better 
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to fall back from Petersburg and confront Johnston’s army 
before attacking Lee.  Grant, confident in his abilities 
and remembering lessons learned at Vicksburg, told Rawlins, 
“that if Johnston could move rapidly enough in such 
weather. . . . he would turn upon him with his whole 
command, crush him and then go after Lee.”60  After his 
meeting with Grant, Sheridan took on his mission with the 
tenacity of a pit bull.  Like Grant, Sheridan decided that 
nothing was going to get in the way of his mission, 
including the rain.  After refitting his men and moving 
them towards Dinwiddie Court House, he had to pause because 
the extremely muddy and almost impassable roads slowed the 
flow of supplies needed by his men.  Grant considered 
postponing the movement, but after conferring with Sheridan 
decided to push through despite the harsh conditions.61  
When asked by one of Grant’s staff how he would combat the 
poor road conditions to supply his army, Sheridan replied, 
“I will get up all the forage I want.   I’ll haul it out if 
I have to set every man in the command to corduroying 
roads, and corduroy every mile of them from the railroad to 
Dinwiddie.  I tell you, I’m ready to strike out to-morrow 
and go to smashing things.”62   To offset the heavy rains 
and prepare to springboard the Union armies westward to 
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counter any escape attempt by Lee, engineers were detailed 
to oversee large numbers of men in corduroying the roads.63   
In modern warfare American combat commanders receive 
both a task, and a purpose for that task in their orders.  
Sheridan understood that his purpose of attack at Five 
Forks was two fold.  The South Side Railroad was not much 
as railroads go.  Its iron rails were worn out and there 
were no facilities close enough to help if any of the old 
and dilapidated locomotives broke down on it.  But it was 
the last supply line into the Confederate capital and Grant 
knew it was critical to Lee’s ability to defend the two 
cities.64  So Grant made sure Sheridan understood that he 
wanted him to not only sever the last remaining supply line 
into Petersburg, but also to bring Lee out of the trenches 
with the intent on capturing Lee’s army.65  The general in 
chief also hoped that by forcing Lee to move troops to his 
right flank to protect the railroad, Lee would weaken the 
center of his defenses allowing Grant the opportunity to 
assault the entrenchments on the southern side of 
Petersburg.66  So sure that Sheridan would succeed, the 
Union general in chief ordered General Godfrey Weitzel, 
commanding Union forces on the north side of the capital, 
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to be ready to enter Richmond as soon as the Confederate 
army retreated.67   
 Initially General Pickett succeeded in pushing back 
Sheridan’s attack, but after realizing he was badly 
outnumbered, he requested permission to withdraw.  After 
his initial preparations for the defense of his new 
position, Pickett left his command to enjoy a fish bake 
with General Thomas Lafayette Rosser of the Confederate 
cavalry.  Sheridan attacked Pickett’s lines on 1 April.  
Several times he was warned about the Union forces 
approaching his position, but failed to return to his 
defenses.  It was not until his forces were under attack 
that the Confederate division commander returned.  By the 
time Pickett returned to his lines, Sheridan’s forces had 
routed his division.68   
After initial success against Pickett’s division, 
which Lee sent out to protect the South Side Railroad, 
Sheridan begged Grant for an infantry corps claiming that 
“we at last have drawn the enemy’s infantry out of its 
fortification, and this is our chance to attack it.”69  
Although Sheridan requested Wright’s Corps, due to 
familiarity and trust gained between the two commanders 
during the Shenandoah Campaign, Grant, due to proximity, 
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attached Major General Gouverneur Warren’s Corps and 
Brigadier General Ranald Mackenzie’s cavalry to Sheridan 
for the attack.  Sheridan, after jumping his mount over 
Pickett’s breastworks, yelled to the Confederate prisoners, 
“Are there any more of you?  We need you all.”70  Unlike 
Lee, who up until the end of the war failed to relieve 
Pickett and others for their incompetence, Sheridan had no 
reservations relieving a corps commander who was only 
attached to his command.  In supporting Sheridan’s cavalry 
attack, Warren’s Corps had moved too slowly for Sheridan 
and Warren failed to push his men into Pickett’s flank 
during the attack.  Thus, Sheridan relieved Warren of 
command, naming Major General Charles Griffin as his 
replacement.  Grant and later Sherman, during the review 
board, supported Sheridan’s decision to relieve Warren.  
 The next day, Lee, realizing that Grant was closing 
the trap on his forces, ordered the evacuation and retreat 
of his army from the entrenchments that protected Richmond 
and Petersburg.  The Confederate government departed the 
capital on trains on the afternoon of 2 April.71  That night 
Confederate forces began withdrawing west, burning key 
bridges on as they passed over them and out of the city.72  
Jefferson Davis tried to depict Lee’s retreat as one of a 
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strategic move towards Southern victory.  He wrote that 
since Lee’s army was “relieved from the necessity of 
guarding particular points, our army will be free to move 
from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from 
his base.”73  But it had been rumored around town that this 
was not the case, and that General Lee, the hero of the 
Confederacy, had lost all hope of victory and did not have 
a plan to save the South.  Mary Chesnut wrote in her diary, 
“They say General Lee is utterly despondent, and has no 
plan if Richmond goes—as go it must.”74 
Knowing that Lee would have to thin his lines to 
reinforce Pickett and protect his western flank after 
Sheridan’s initial success at Five Forks, Grant ordered a 
general assault all along the lines for the following 
morning.  At 5:00 a.m. on 3 April the artillery opened up 
on the Confederate trenches and at 6:00 a.m. the Union 
infantry assaulted.75  Despite stiff isolated pockets of 
resistance, the assault was successful.  Grant’s plan so 
far had worked.  He now had the opportunity to destroy the 
most powerful force in the Confederacy.   
At 5:10 that morning, Meade informed Grant that 
Colonel Ralph Ely’s Brigade of the 1st Division, IX Corps 
was in possession of Petersburg.76  Upon entering Petersburg 
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with Meade, Grant realized that Lee’s Army had escaped.  He 
quickly turned his forces west and ordered an all out 
pursuit of the enemy.  Grant deliberately kept most of his 
forces out of the trenches around Petersburg and Richmond 
“so as to start them out on the Danville Road early in the 
morning.”77  And part of General Edward Ord’s Army of the 
James was sent on a parallel southern route in order to 
block any attempt by Lee to move towards Danville.  General 
Meade and his Army of the Potomac, minus the IX Corps which 
was ordered to guard the South Side Rail Road and gain 
control of Petersburg, were immediately sent after Lee’s 
demoralized troops.78  V Corps followed closely behind 
Sheridan’s cavalry.  Major General Andrew Atkinson 
Humphreys moved his II Corps along River Road in directly 
behind V Corps.79  General Wright immediately turned his VI 
Corps, Army of the Potomac, down River Road in pursuit of 
Lee’s force as well.80   
Not resting on the most significant victory of the war 
so far, Grant reiterated his intent by writing in a 
dispatch, “Rebel armies are now the only strategic points 
to strike at.”81  His forces now in pursuit, Grant took the 
time to telegraph Lincoln that he was in control of 
Petersburg and to ask the now exuberant President to meet 
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him at the city.82  By 8:00 a.m. on the same day Union 
soldiers entered the Confederate capital.  Shortly after 
the meeting between Grant and the President, General 
Weitzel notified the Lieutenant General that he was in 
control of Richmond and was putting out fires within the 
city.  Weitzel also stated that the Confederate government 
was gone.83   
Over the next three days, Union forces pursued Lee’s 
fleeing army along the River and Namozine roads.84  
Confederate soldiers marched day and night attempting to 
escape Grant’s forces.  Captain Thomas Blake, commander of 
the Company E, 10th Virginia Artillery Battalion, stated, 
“we made very slow progress” the first night.  Several 
times during the night he remembered they would “move a few 
yards and then halt for an hour or two.”85  Confederate 
infantryman St. George Tucker Coulter Bryan wrote in his 
diary, he could not “remember sleeping a single night.”  He 
“must have slept.  Have repeatedly slept on [the] march.”  
Provost guards had to work all night “arousing & starting 
off men who had fallen asleep on roadside.”86  The anxiety 
of being captured, mixed with the constant marching, took 
its toll.  Lieutenant J. F. J. Caldwell, remembered “Some 
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of us were so worn, that we slept like the dead—others so 
anxious and harassed that we could not sleep at all.”87  
The rain made the roads an obstacle for both sides. 
General Meade stated that, “the progress of the troops was 
greatly impeded by the bad character of the road.”88  
General Hunt, chief of the Army of the Potomac’s artillery, 
observed that, “the severe marching . . . . over the bad 
roads . . . broke down many of the horses which at the 
commencement of the campaign were not in very good 
condition.”89  Colonel Theodore Lyman wrote in his diary 
that, the “steady and drenching rain . . . . reduced these 
sandy, clayey roads to a puddling or porridge.”90  Of the 
two forces however, it hurt the Army of Northern Virginia 
the most.  Infantrymen can move on such roads better than 
wagons or horse-drawn artillery.  Cavalry, although slower 
than normal, still had the advantage of speed.  The Army of 
the Potomac’s Chief Quartermaster stated that in such 
dreadful conditions it took “600 wagons with the aid of 
1000 engineer troops. . . . fifty six hours [to move] five 
miles.”91  Lee’s supply trains, numbering more than one 
thousand wagons, were spread out over thirty miles of road 
and were being pulled by weak horses.92  Therefore the 
fastest elements of the Union army could out pace Lee’s 
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wagons, causing Lee’s rear units to conduct a constant rear 
guard fight.93  
On 3 April, the rain stopped and the weather was “warm 
and pleasant.”94  A brigade of Confederate cavalry was left 
at Namozine Creek, assigned to delay Sheridan’s men while 
the slow-moving Confederate column made its way to Amelia 
Court House, another ten miles up the road.  After heavy 
fighting between the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry and the 8th 
and 15th New York Cavalry Regiments, most of the 
Carolinians that were left in the depleted unit were killed 
or captured.  Those who did escape made their way to 
Namozine Church.  There, General George Armstrong Custer 
committed the 15th New York against the remnants of the 2nd 
Cavalry, most of whom turned and fled.  The Confederate 
infantry brigade under the command of General Rufus 
Barringer was guarding a Confederate wagon train, but once 
the 15th New York routed the 2nd North Carolina Cavalry, 
Barringer’s Brigade collapsed as well.  General Barringer 
himself almost escaped, but after spotting gray-clad 
cavalrymen he joined the men and proposed to set out and 
find Major General Fitzhugh Lee.  Shortly afterward, the 
gray clad cavalrymen dropped their disguise and raised 
their pistols and announced that they were Sheridan’s 
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Scouts.95  That same afternoon, the 1st District of Columbia 
Cavalry captured three hundred confederate soldiers, four 
guns, and some wagons.96   The V Corps, after following the 
South Side Railroad to the Namozine and River Roads, ran 
into Confederate cavalry under Fitzhugh Lee on the night of 
the 3 April, but darkness curtailed much of a fight.97 
The roads leading out of Petersburg were so congested 
with Union infantry, wagons and cavalry that priority had 
to be set between which units could move and which had to 
give way to the others.  On 4 April, Meade ordered General 
Wright and his II Corps to give way to the cavalry and to 
the V Corps.98  Several hours later that afternoon Meade 
redirected Wright to push by V Corps and the cavalry trains 
and to get as far forward as possible.99  Fifteen minutes 
after directing Wright to push forward, Meade contacted 
Sheridan requesting to know what roads the cavalrymen were 
taking so that Meade could use alternate routes to get his 
infantry corps up after Lee as fast as possible.100  On 4 
and 5 April, Meade wrote to Sheridan explaining that his 
cavalry trains had cut off Humphreys’ II Corps.101  The 
limited roads heading west caused considerable difficulties 
in the Union forces closing on the enemy, but the fact that 
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they crowded on these roads together shows their 
determination to get after Lee.     
Planning to march to Burkeville before moving south to 
Danville, Lee ordered his subordinate commanders to rally 
at Amelia Court House.  According to Lee, he had made 
arrangements to have supplies awaiting his army at the 
train station there, but was sorely surprised to find none 
when he arrived there on the morning of 4 April.102  Instead 
he found boxes of ammunition and some artillery 
harnesses.103  According to historian William Marvel, the 
first of Lee’s forces at the Court House were able to draw 
a partial ration from a small but inadequate stockpile.104  
With a starving army to feed and only part of his troops at 
the rally point, Lee sent out men and wagons to scour the 
countryside to feed his army.  Lee also sent a dispatch 
from the telegram office in Jetersville requesting 200,000 
rations to be sent immediately to Amelia.105  The lines, 
however, were cut at Jetersville as well, and Lee’s 
dispatch rider continued on toward Burkeville with the 
intention of telegraphing the request for supplies from 
there.  Sheridan’s troopers, however, captured the dispatch 
carrier and upon searching him, they found the dispatch in 
his boot.106  Sheridan’s own trains were far behind and the 
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Union cavalry also needed provisions, so, in a stroke of 
brilliance, he ordered some of his men to Burkeville to 
send the dispatch just as it had been written, in the hopes 
that his cavalry would be resupplied by the graces of the 
Confederacy.107  However, after receiving several telegrams 
requesting that supplies be sent, General Henry Harrison 
who was in charge of guarding the Richmond-Danville 
Railroad, believed it to be an enemy ruse and chose not to 
send the supplies.108  Some of Lee’s foragers were captured 
in the countryside surrounding Amelia Court House by Union 
cavalry.109  Confederate cavalry pushed further down the 
road toward Jetersville to scout Lee’s advance when they 
ran into Union troops along the rail line near 
Jetersville.110  
On the morning of 4 April, Sheridan ordered Major 
General George Crook to move his division of cavalry toward 
Jetersville and destroy part of the Danville Railroad.  The 
V Corps had followed close behind.  Hearing from his scouts 
that Lee’s entire army was at Amelia, Sheridan hurried to 
Jetersville.  Arriving there at 5:00 p.m. that evening, he 
confirmed Lee’s position.  Part of Sheridan’s cavalry and 
the V Corps entrenched that night along the Richmond-
Danville Railroad.111  The cavalry commander sent both Meade 
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and Grant a dispatch stating, “the whole of Lee’s army is 
at or near Amelia Court House, and on this side of it. . . 
. We can capture the Army of Northern Virginia if force 
enough be thrown to this point.”112  Based on Lee’s request 
for rations that Sheridan’s men had intercepted, the 
cavalry commander also informed Grant that they were out of 
rations.  Grant, realizing that only one corps of infantry 
and a small contingent of cavalry stood between Lee and 
escape, ordered Meade to Jetersville “with all dispatch.”113  
Meade ordered his army to conduct a forced night march to 
Jetersville.  Humphreys started toward Jetersville between 
1:00 and 2:00 a.m. and Wright started his movement an hour 
later.114    
At 1:00 p.m. in the afternoon Lee moved toward 
Jetersville and conducted a reconnaissance of the area.  He 
also attempted to get information from local farmers.  
After conferring with his son, Fitzhugh Lee, in charge of 
the cavalry, Lee decided that Union forcers were too strong 
to attack.  Instead, he ordered his army to move toward 
Farmville and eventually wanted to reach Lynchburg, more 
than fifty miles away.115  That day Lee ordered his slow and 
cumbersome train of wagons to move to the northwest to get 
a head start on his army.   
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Sheridan was a busy man on 5 April.  There before him 
stood Lee’s Army, the final objective of the war in the 
East.  Knowing that Lee had been conducting a 
reconnaissance of his positions, Sheridan ordered a brigade 
of cavalry to conduct a reconnaissance of the Paine’s 
Crossroads.  Crook sent Davies’ brigade of cavalry and the 
Union horsemen caught Lee’s trains attempting to move out 
in front of his main force.  Davies attacked, and initially 
the Confederate infantry pushed the overzealous cavalrymen 
back.  After Sheridan reinforced Davies with two additional 
brigades of cavalry, the horsemen were able to burn over 
two hundred of the enemy wagons and also captured five 
pieces of artillery.116   
The II Corps reached Jetersville between mid-afternoon 
and early evening on the 5th.117  Meade arrived at 
approximately 2:00 p.m., but was not feeling well, so he 
requested that Sheridan emplace his troops.  He told 
Sheridan that he planned on attacking Lee once all of his 
forces were up.  General Meade ordered General Humphreys to 
“push on as rapidly as possible . . . without fear of [his] 
flanks.”118  “It being plain that Lee would attempt to 
escape as soon as his trains were out of the way,” Sheridan 
urged Meade to attack right away.119  Meade, always cautious 
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and insistent on setting the conditions, did not want to 
attack Lee until VI Corps had arrived.  The frustrated 
cavalry commander sent Grant another dispatch, reiterating 
the momentous opportunity they had and requesting Grant’s 
presence.  The VI Corps did not arrive at Jetersville until 
sometime shortly before or right after dark on the 5th and 
immediately threw up breastworks.  The opportunity to 
attack Lee that day was gone.120   
After getting the frustrated dispatch from Sheridan 
late that night, Grant decided to go to Jetersville and 
meet with his commanders.  He needed to personally assess 
the situation and talk to both of his subordinate 
commanders face to face.  Along with a few staff officers 
and a small cavalry escort, Grant moved first to Sheridan’s 
then Meade’s headquarters.  Once there, Grant reinforced 
Sheridan’s sense of urgency and prodded Meade into action.   
Apprised of the situation, Grant told Meade that they “did 
not want to follow the enemy; [they] wanted to get ahead of 
him, and that his [Meade’s] orders would allow the enemy to 
escape.”121  
Almost as if hearing Grant’s guidance to Meade to 
press forward, Lee realized the window of escape would 
close the next day and ordered an early morning movement on 
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6 April.  General James Longstreet’s First and Third Corps, 
led the Confederate column out of Amelia.  Richard 
Anderson’s Corps was behind Longstreet, and General Richard 
Ewell’s Corps followed next.  What was left of the 
Confederate wagon train followed Ewell’s column, protected 
by John Gordon’s Corps which also acted as rear guard.122 
 The issue of supplies at Amelia Court House created 
controversy in 1865 and among historians for more than a 
century.  Some historians consider this delay to have been 
the last nail in Lee’s coffin.  Burke Davis writes that 
“loss of a day’s march would bring the enemy on their 
heels.”123  Emory Thomas stated, that Lee’s failure to 
gather supplies at Amelia Court House would rank “among the 
hypothetical imponderables of the Confederate War.”124  Most 
of this speculation comes from Lee himself, who stated in a 
letter to President Davis that “the delay was fatal and 
could not be retrieved.”125  
There are two factors to consider when dealing with 
the supply controversy.  First of all, why were the 
supplies that Lee had expected at Amelia not there, and 
secondly, should Lee have paused for a full day there to 
gather supplies to feed his army knowing the Union armies 
were chasing after him?  Some historians, including Robert 
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Hendrickson and Burke Davis, simply rely on Lee’s letter to 
President Davis about his fatal delay at Amelia Court 
House, as proof that supplies were ordered but failed to 
arrive.  Of all who have written about this campaign only 
Edward Pollard and Douglas Southall Freeman have addressed 
this issue in detail.  Pollard blamed the affair on the 
“authorities in Richmond.”  He argued that Lee had 
“dispatched a most distinct and urgent order that large 
supplies of commissary and quartermaster’s stores should be 
sent forward from Danville to Amelia Court House.”126  The 
trains that were filled with supplies did not stop at 
Amelia to resupply General Lee’s army, but instead were 
pushed on into Richmond to relieve the flood of government 
evacuees out of Richmond.127  Freeman goes further in 
identifying the different points of view.  One point of 
view argued that the trains laden with rations had been 
rerouted at the last minute to continue on to Richmond.  
Freeman also reveals that Fitz Lee cited an unnamed source 
who stated that the officer in charge of the supplies was 
met at Amelia Court House by an unidentified representative 
from the government who ordered the train to continue on to 
Richmond without unloading the supplies.  President Davis 
stated that neither he nor the Richmond authorities had 
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been involved in rerouting the trains laden with supplies 
onto Richmond.  To defend himself, Davis went so far as 
influencing General Isaac Munroe St. John, the Confederate 
Commissary General, and others to write letters stating 
that Lee did not request that supplies be sent to Amelia 
Court House.  Freeman argues that these letters were proof 
that Lee had not specifically requested in writing for 
supplies to be sent to Amelia.128  Lee’s biographer goes 
further in identifying the dispatch on 2 April, in which 
Lee told Breckinridge that he was to “give all orders that 
you find necessary in and about Richmond, the troops will 
all be directed to Amelia Court House.”129  There is no 
doubt that at least one of Lee’s corps commanders thought 
there would be supplies at Amelia Court House.  Longstreet 
recalled that, “orders had been sent for provisions to meet 
us at the Court-House.”130  Colonel Walter Taylor, Lee’s 
chief of staff, stated that the last order to Breckinridge 
was satisfactory in Lee expecting that supplies would be 
sent to Amelia Court House.131  One thing is certain:  
someone was responsible for the supply failure.    
Historian Robert Krick, in his book Staff Officers in 
Gray, posits that the Confederate general staff was lacking 
throughout the war and considering the amount of grief 
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given to commissary officers, the department “could not 
have attracted many enthusiastic patriots.”132  One can 
surmise that such a weak staff would be even less effective 
during an evacuation of their capital.  In support of Lee’s 
claim, some ordnance and other supplies were delivered to 
Amelia Court House.  Therefore, Lee’s request for supplies 
must have been effective in getting supplies sent to Amelia 
Court House.  Thus Fitz Lee’s account of the logistical 
nightmare is possible.  Lieutenant Wise’s account of the 
Confederate government leaving Richmond supports this 
theory as well.  Stationed at Clover Station, he watched as 
each train passed on its way out of Richmond toward the new 
Confederate capital of Danville.  Wise recalled that “train 
after train . . . .[were] all loaded to their utmost 
capacity.”133  This leads one to believe that every car was 
needed, and that in the frenzy of escaping the enemy, some 
representative of the Confederate government ordered Lee’s 
supply trains on to Richmond.   
This issue resolved, one may question Lee’s decision 
to remain at Amelia to gather supplies.  Marvel cites some 
evidence that Lee’s army had adequate food supplies and 
that his delay was less from a lack of supplies and more 
from the slowness of his supply trains in getting to Amelia 
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Court House.134  Historian Chris Calkins offers that Lee’s 
Commissary General had over 300,000 rations at Richmond.  
At Danville, there were 1,500,000 rations of meat and 
500,000 bread rations.  Lynchburg contained at least 
180,000 rations of bread and meat.  Lee’s army was not 
hungry due to a lack of rations, but in his inability to 
procure and distribute the rations to his troops because 
they were under the constant attack of the Federal 
forces.135  In reality, Lee’s decision to stop for a day at 
Amelia Court House was based on the need to wait for the 
rest of his army to get there.  “As late as 10:00 P.M [on 
the night of 4 April]” General Ewell’s column “was still 
trying to find its way across the Appomattox,” and 
Anderson’s and Gordon’s Corps had still not arrived 
either.136  Ewell’s Corps did not arrive at Amelia Court 
House until 5 April.  It was held up first in an attempt to 
control the mobs within Richmond then by the failure of 
Confederate engineers to provide a pontoon bridge at the 
flooded and unusable Genito Bridge.137   
On the night of 5 April, and early the next morning, 
Lee’s army finally departed the rallying point at Amelia 
Court House with all his men.  Given these facts, one can 
argue that it was convenient for Lee to blame his failure 
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on an issue that was out of his hands.  As Marvel posits, 
Lee might have “uncharacteristically sought to shift 
responsibility from himself . . . . to some faceless 
functionary.”138  This argument’s validity is strengthened 
by the fact that Lee, even when pressed by Breckinridge to 
explain to Davis that he could no longer win the war, 
instead chose to state that the matter would be based on 
“the disposition and feelings  of the people,” ignoring the 
military realities.139   
 In fact, Lee’s pause at Amelia Court House caused the 
only hesitation of the Union commanders during their 
pursuit.  While General Sheridan pushed for a hurried 
attack on Lee, Meade cautiously decided to wait until all 
of his forces were present before the attack.140  This 
allowed time for Lee’s forces to concentrate and move 
westward.  Had Lee not stopped at Amelia Court House, 
Meade’s leading corps might have cut off some of the Army 
of Northern Virginia.   
   Motivated by Grant’s talk on the night of 5 April, 
Meade ordered his army to attack at 6:00 a.m. the following 
morning.141  Lee’s decision to wait for his forces and 
attempt to gather supplies, the speed of movement by the 
Union cavalry and the V Corps, Meade’s insistence on having 
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the entire army present before attacking, and Grant’s 
prodding of his subordinate leaders, would set the 
conditions for the Battle of Sailor’s Creek the very next 
day. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE BATTLE:  THIS IS THE END 
 
Amelia Court House 
As dawn approached on the morning of 6 April, the 
Union army was stretched in a four-mile long line of 
battle.  Soldiers from both armies were awakened by a heavy 
rain.1  George Armstrong Custer’s cavalry division was on 
the right flank with Ranald Mackenzie’s division covering 
the left flank.  Three infantry corps of the Army of the 
Potomac were in between the cavalry divisions, with the II 
Corps on the southern or left side, the V Corps in the 
middle, and the VI Corps on the right, all facing in a 
northeasterly direction.  Because VI Corps and the Union 
cavalry “had formerly served so harmoniously and so 
efficiently in the valley” Grant ordered the VI Corps to 
move to the far left of the line so that it was next to 
Sheridan’s cavalry and in the best position to block the 
retreat of Lee’s army.2     
Lee’s army had now moved fifty miles from Richmond 
and, although his army had been attrited along the way, it 
was still managing to evade a major engagement with the 
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pursuing Union forces.  In order to flank the Federals at 
Jetersville and once more escape the Union juggernaut, Lee 
ordered his army to march early on the morning of 6 April. 
With his route to Danville blocked, Lee’s only option was 
to retreat toward Lynchburg.  Longstreet’s Corps led off, 
moving before daylight.  His mission was to “head off and 
prevent the enemy’s infantry columns [from] passing [them] 
and standing across [their] march.”3  Lee could ill afford 
to let the Union forces block his path again.  Behind 
Longstreet came Lieutenant General Richard Anderson’s 
Corps, then Lieutenant General Ewell’s.  Gordon’s Corps was 
last in the order of march; his mission was to protect the 
trains and to act as rear guard for the army.4    
While the better part of General George Meade’s Army 
of the Potomac was encamped around Jetersville the night of 
5 April, part of Major General E. O. C. Ord’s Army of the 
James was entrenched around Burkeville.5  Grant ordered him 
to move west on 6 April and “cut off all the roads between 
there and Farmville.”6  Ord, understanding the commander’s 
intent, actually struck out of Burkeville before Grant’s 
orders arrived.  Realizing the importance of High Bridge, 
Ord sent a detachment of two infantry regiments along with 
eighty cavalrymen to burn the bridge to deny it as an 
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escape route to the enemy.  The mission was a tactical 
failure in that the Union infantry and accompanying 
cavalrymen did not succeed in burning the bridge.7  In 
fact, in a sharp engagement with Confederate cavalry, every 
officer and soldier within the detachment was either 
killed, wounded, or captured.8  Despite the tactical 
failure, the mission to High Bridge was a strategic Union 
victory for two reasons.  First, General Longstreet at the 
front of Lee’s column thought the two regiments were an 
advanced party of a larger Union column and entrenched his 
corps preparing for an attack by Union forces.  This slowed 
the whole Confederate movement into Farmville, causing a 
time delay just enough for Union forces to prevent 
Confederate forces from burning the same bridge after they 
crossed the Appomattox River the next day.  More directly 
involved with Sailor’s Creek, the action at High Bridge 
caused the majority of the Confederate cavalry assets to be 
pushed forward.  Up to that point, Lee’s cavalrymen had 
been plugging holes in the Confederate column and checking 
the Union cavalry.  Longstreet realized that with Ord 
located at Burkesville, High Bridge was his only escape 
route across the Appomattox River.  Therefore, Longstreet 
ordered all the available cavalry forward to save the 
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bridge, and thus none were available to plug the gap 
between Anderson’s and Longstreet’s Corps at Marshall’s 
Crossroads.9   
On the morning of 6 April, Sheridan ordered his three 
cavalry divisions to follow a southern parallel route to 
that of the Confederates and at every opportunity to attack 
the rear of the army.  Sheridan knew that he would have to 
stop Lee’s column in order to allow the Union infantry time 
to catch and destroy it.10   
If one of his divisions had success the other two 
divisions were to move in and support that division.  If a 
division faced too much opposition, the other divisions 
were to leap-frog forward along the parallel route and 
attack further along the Confederate column.11   
Major General Andrew Humphreys’ II Corps, the first 
corps into Jetersville the day before, departed in pursuit 
of the Confederate column at 6:00 a.m. with the Second and 
First Divisions abreast and the Third Division following 
the First Division. One division commander in Humphreys’ 
Corps had made the mistake of not possessing the sense of 
urgency shown by the rest of the Army of the Potomac.  
Brigadier General William Hays’ Second Division failed to 
depart on time.  Humphreys proceeded to Hays’ headquarters 
 110 
where he found everyone sleeping.  He promptly relieved the 
division commander and assigned Brigadier General Thomas 
Smythe to command until the newly assigned Brevet Major 
General Francis Barlow could take command.12  As in the case 
of Sheridan with Warren and V Corps, Grant’s subordinate 
commanders knew the commander’s intent to catch and destroy 
Lee’s army, and there was no toleration for those officers 
not putting forth their full efforts in achieving that 
goal. 
Initially Humphreys’ Corps moved in a northeast 
direction, but due to the broken ground and trees in the 
area, his infantrymen deviated almost directly north.  They 
left the roads and instead moved across the fields and 
through the woods.  This deviation proved critical to the 
success of Humphreys’ lead elements spotting Lee’s rear 
guard.  Had they not veered to the left while marching 
north to attack the Confederate army, they might have 
missed Lee altogether.  Lee’s forces burned the bridge at 
Flat Creek, but Union engineers quickly built several 
others to replace it.  After crossing over the creek a 
reconnoitering detachment from II Corps found the enemy on 
the left of the corps moving in a westerly direction.  
Humphreys immediately swung his corps to the left, ordered 
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a brigade to attack the enemy and reported to Meade the 
enemy’s position.  Shortly after, by midmorning, Humphreys 
received a dispatch from Major General Alexander Stewart 
Webb, Meade’s chief of staff, directing him to push towards 
Deatonsville.  VI Corps would move through Jetersville and 
reposition on Humphreys’ southern flank.13  Humphreys 
ordered General Gershom Mott, commanding Third Division, to 
lead the corps toward Deatonsville and Ligontown.14  Third 
Division, II Corps was now closest to Gordon’s rear guard.   
The II Corps battled with Gordon’s Corps in a running 
fight throughout the rest of the day.15  Union skirmish duty 
continued to rotate between the regiments; as the advanced 
regiment, acting as skirmishers, ran out of ammunition they 
moved aside and the next regiment would take the lead and 
push skirmishers forward.16 General Mott, knowing the 
importance of maintaining contact with the rear of Lee’s 
army, moved to the front of his division to personally 
oversee the fight.  While conferring with Brigadier General 
Regis de Trobriand, the First Brigade, Third Division 
commander, Mott was shot through the leg and handed the 
division over to De Trobriand.17  The new division commander 
was supposed to link the right flank of his forces with the 
First Division, II Corps, but having moved along another 
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route, General Nelson Miles’ First Division had not caught 
up yet.  A level-headed new commander, not understanding 
Grant’s intent, might have waited for the First Division to 
catch up so that his flank was not exposed, but De 
Trobriand “realized that the enemy’s was within [his] reach 
if [he] advanced promptly.”18  He formed the 40th New York 
Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Madison M. 
Cannon, and advanced on the enemy.  De Trobriand stated in 
his official report that the “élan of the men was 
remarkable and argued well for the success of the day.”19  
As the rear guard hastily formed behind makeshift 
breastworks, De Trobriand’s line of battle would assault 
and carry the position.  When stiffer resistance was met, 
Captain John Roder’s 4th United States Artillery Battery 
along with Captain James Webb Adams’ 10th Massachusetts 
Light Artillery Battery, which traveled near the front 
behind the skirmishers, would deploy and support the 
assault.20   
De Trobriand received confirmation that his bold 
pursuit was the right action when Humphreys sent him 
instructions “urging the importance of pressing the enemy 
without loss of time.”21 At Deatonsville, where Gordon’s men 
“held a strong position”, Humphreys joined De Trobriand’s 
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command and recommended that when possible the men should 
especially concentrate on capturing the enemy’s guns.22 One 
can only speculate that Humphreys was keeping in mind that 
Brigadier General Henry Davies’ First Brigade, Second 
Cavalry Division, had captured some of General Fitzhugh 
Lee’s artillery two days earlier.23  This indeed was 
prophetic, for later that day General Ewell’s lack of 
artillery in the second engagement of Sailor’s Creek, at 
Hillsman House, allowed Union artillery to move unhindered 
within eight hundred yards of the Confederate breastworks 
across Sailor’s Creek.  As De Trobriand continued to strike 
the rear of Gordon’s Corps, Union cavalry were positioning 
to attack and slow down Ewell’s and Anderson’s Corps.   
 After riding hard that morning, Custer stopped to let 
his division water their horses and was warned by an aide 
that they had found a gap in Lee’s column.  Not wasting any 
time, he ordered his brigade to mount up and off they went 
toward Marshall’s Crossroads.24  Two and a half miles 
southwest of Deatonsville, Colonel Peter Stagg’s Michigan 
Brigade of Brigadier General Thomas Devin’s First Cavalry 
Division caught up with the rear of the Confederate wagon 
trains.  Not wanting the Confederate column to slip away, 
General Sheridan authorized General Devin to order Colonel 
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Stagg’s Michigan Cavalry to conduct a mounted charge 
supported by artillery against Gordon’s veteran troops.25   
Meanwhile, Custer’s Division pushed on down the 
parallel route and moved north past Sailor’s Creek and 
attacked a gap in the line between General William Mahone’s 
Division of Longstreet’s Corps and General Richard 
Anderson’s Corps.  By 12:40 p.m. Sheridan reported that he 
had checked the enemy advance and urged the infantry to 
move quickly up to attack.26  He wrote to Grant, “We are 
shelling their trains and preparing  to attack their 
infantry.  Our troops are moving on their left flank, and I 
think we can break and disperse them.”27  General Wright 
sent his staff forward to coordinate with Sheridan and 
report on the progress of his corps.28 
By the time the leading elements of the Humphreys’ II 
Corps reached Holt’s Corner, a crossroads just northeast of 
Sailor’s Creek, General Horatio Wright’s VI Corps, along 
with some of Sheridan’s cavalry, approached from the south.  
Gordon attempted to make a stand there by using a slightly 
sunken road as partial coverage.  This defense, more than 
any other, had to hold because the Army of Northern 
Virginia’s supply train of three hundred wagons was 
literally on the other side of the Confederate lines, 
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jammed up against Sailor’s Creek.  Initial assaults by 
leading elements of Humphreys’ Corps and Sheridan’s cavalry 
had failed, but Brigadier General Truman Seymour’s Third 
Division, VI Corps approached from the south and flanked 
Gordon’s men, carrying the position.29   
Marshall’s Crossroads 
When Custer’s cavalrymen arrived at Marshall’s 
Crossroads, the only Confederate combat unit in the area 
was an artillery battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Frank 
Huger.  Huger, realizing that a gap was growing between 
Major General William Mahone’s division and Major General 
George Pickett’s division in Anderson’s Corps, moved his 
artillery train forward and had just passed the crossroads 
when the Union cavalrymen arrived.30  Custer’s men charged 
the trains and only two of Huger’s artillery pieces were 
able to unlimber and fire before being overrun by the red-
scarfed cavalrymen.  Custer’s troopers captured at least 15 
of Huger’s guns.31 As Custer’s men were torching the wagons, 
Anderson’s divisions under Pickett and Major General 
Bushrod Johnson charged and drove off the Union 
cavalrymen.32  Custer sent dispatches to both Devin and 
Crook stating that he had captured a large portion of the 
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trains, but was hard pressed by infantry and called for 
their assistance.33   
Both divisions rode to support Custer.  Devin brought 
up his division on Custer’s flank and was able to check the 
infantry assault by Pickett’s and Johnson’s divisions.34  
Upon arriving, General Crook, the Second Cavalry Division 
Commander, ordered J. Irvin Gregg’s Brigade to the west to 
cut off Anderson’s escape.35  While Gregg’s brigade blocked 
off the road to the west, General Davies’s First Brigade 
conducted a mounted charge, leaping over the breast works 
along the road.36  The Confederate infantry entrenched and 
put up hasty breast works.  Colonel William R. Aylett, 
commanding the 53rd Virginia Infantry Regiment within 
Pickett’s division, stated after “marching and fighting” 
for days, we had to “stay and fight to avoid being ridden 
over by the troopers.”37  Custer and Devin’s divisions made 
several dismounted and mounted assaults against the 
Anderson’s Corps, but were repulsed.  Like Sheridan at Five 
Forks, Custer used his division band to start playing 
during a final mounted charge that drove off the infantry 
brigades in front of them.38   
Anderson attempted to have his divisions cover one 
another as they bypassed the Union cavalry.  First, 
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Pickett’s Division would form against the cavalry while 
Johnson’s moved behind, and then Johnson’s Division would 
form to allow Pickett to bypass.  Johnson’s Division was 
moving around Pickett’s Division when Custer mounted his 
final cavalry assault.  Some Union cavalry got behind 
Pickett’s Division during that last assault and Pickett 
ordered a retreat.  As Pickett’s Division retrograded 
across an open field, an aide brought one of Pickett’s 
brigade commanders, Brigadier General William A. Terry, his 
horse.  Mounting his horse, Terry fled the battlefield, 
leaving his brigade to fend for itself.  Seeing Terry’s 
departure caused a general panic among the rest of the 
brigade, and the command disintegrated and ran for the 
woods.  The Federal cavalry charged and before the 
Confederate column could reach the woods, the men in blue 
were on them.39  Anderson told Pickett that his men should 
attempt to fight their way out, but every time they 
attempted to escape, Custer’s cavalry charged and drove 
them back into the woods.40  Colonel Aylett remembered that 
when the “retreat was ordered” they “were not in good 
running order” and after being “enveloped” they “could not 
get away.”41  Approximately six hundred men from Pickett’s 
Division escaped the Union onslaught.  Due to their closer 
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proximity to the rest of Lee’s Army, and in part by 
leadership displayed by men like Henry Wise, more of 
Bushrod Johnson’s Division escaped.42  Once again Pickett, 
as well as Bushrod Johnson, abandoned their divisions and 
fled the battlefield.43 After routing almost two complete 
Confederate divisions under the command of Johnson and 
Pickett in Anderson’s Corps, the Federal cavalry turned to 
the northeast, coming up directly behind Ewell’s line of 
battle.44    
Hillsman House 
Historian Joseph Mitchell correctly stresses the fact 
“that Grant’s troops were able to close with the retreating 
Confederates is an indication of how hard and fast they 
also had been marching.”45  VI Corps, being the last to 
bivouac the night before near Jetersville, got only about 
two to three hours of sleep that night.  On the morning of 
6 April, thinking that Lee was still at Amelia Court House, 
VI Corps initially marched for a couple of hours in the 
wrong direction.  However, after hearing the sounds of 
gunfire from the Federal cavalry and receiving the orders 
from Sheridan to move with all possible haste, Wright’s 
Corps marched hard the last hour over plowed, wet fields in 
order to get to the battle in time.  Upon arriving at the 
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battlefield, the men of Wheaton’s First Division “with the 
greatest spirit,” “double-quicked” into position to attack 
Ewell’s Corps.46   
Ewell, informed that a large force of cavalry held the 
road in front of Anderson, rode forward to discuss their 
options with Anderson.  At about that time, he found out 
that a large force of Union infantry was forming for attack 
around the Hillsman House.  Anderson suggested that Ewell 
check the assault in the rear and he would make the attack 
on the Union cavalry in the front.  Ewell then entrenched 
his corps along the military crest on the southern side of 
Sailor’s Creek.47  Custis Lee placed his division on the 
left flank of the Confederate line and General Joseph 
Brevard Kershaw placed his division on the right.48  The 
length of Ewell’s line of battle could not have been more 
than a few hundred yards long.  What little force he had 
left was concentrated, for the most part, in plain view of 
the Hillsman House.  Sheridan ordered Colonel Peter Stagg’s 
brigade of cavalry to demonstrate against Ewell’s Corps in 
order to hold them in position until Wright’s infantry 
arrived.  Stagg was drastically outnumbered, but his feint 
attack worked, holding Ewell’s Corps in position.  As 
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Stagg’s men fell back to the left of the Hillsman House, 
Wright arrived at the head of Seymour’s Division.49   
When Seymour’s Division flanked Gordon at Holt’s 
Corner, Gordon had to move on a northerly route which 
separated the last two Confederate corps.  Seymour then 
rounded the turn at Hillsman House and deployed his 
division to the right side of the road leading to Sailor’s 
Creek. It was approximately 3:00 in the afternoon.  As 
parts of Brigadier J. Warren Keifer’s Third Division, VI 
Corps attacked through Gordon’s line at Holt’s Corner they 
became entangled in II Corps, which was attacking to their 
right.  For some reason officers from II Corps failed to 
release these men back to VI Corps for their attack on 
Ewell’s Corps across the creek.50  General Frank Wheaton’s 
First Division was deployed to the left of Seymour’s and 
both started down the road to the creek, meeting some 
skirmishers along the way.51  
Brevet Major General George W. Getty’s Division did 
not make it to Sailor’s Creek in time for the assault.  Of 
the two divisions of Wright’s Corps that fought at Sailor’s 
Creek, both attacked Ewell without the full complement of 
their command.  First, Keifer’s incomplete brigade in 
Seymour’s division was still entangled with II Corps, and 
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additionally Brevet Brigadier General William Penrose’s 
First Brigade was not up to make the hurried attack.  
Sheridan, positioned at the Hillsman House, found out from 
a brave Union cavalryman who rode straight through the 
Confederate lines to report that Anderson’s Corps was being 
routed.52  He then ordered Wright’s incomplete corps into 
battle in order to mass forces with his cavalry on the 
opposite side of Ewell.53    
VI Corps artillery hurried into position around the 
Hillsman House approximately five to six hundred yards from 
Ewell’s line of battle.54  At approximately 5:30 p.m. the 
entire brigade of VI Corps artillery commanded by Major 
Andrew Cowan, bombarded Ewell’s Corps without fear of 
counter battery fire, for the only artillerymen still with 
Ewell at Sailor’s Creek had been converted into infantrymen 
and were holding the center of Ewell’s line.55  Ewell’s 
error in judgment, failing to ensure his corps traveled 
with some sort of artillery, was costly.  Captain Webb 
Adams, commanding the Massachusetts 10th Light Artillery 
Battery, stated that his battery alone fired thirty-seven 
rounds at Ewell’s line.56  As the Confederates forces turned 
to get into position defending about a third of the way up 
the hill Union artillery rained down upon their lines.57 
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Upon reaching the flooded Sailor’s Creek that caused 
so much heartache for the Confederates, the Union 
infantrymen crossed the swampy river while exposed to 
“severe front and enfilading fire.”58  Wheaton’s men tried 
to form on the far side of the river, but the ground in 
front of his right flank, Third Brigade, nearest the road, 
was not steep enough and the Confederate line easily fired 
down upon them.59  On the right side of the road Seymour’s 
Division exited the creek first and ran directly into 
Custis Lee’s Division, and as the first line of Union 
infantry exited the creek, the converted artillery brigade 
under Custis Lee’s command discharged heavy and accurate 
plunging fire into the Union line.  Despite the heavy fire 
from the Confederate lines, the Union lines pushed on up 
the hill into the Confederate breastworks.  The converted 
Confederate artillerymen under command of Colonel Stapleton 
Crutchfield fought hand to hand with the Union infantrymen.  
The center of the Confederate line then charged and pushed 
part of Edwards’ Third Brigade, along with Seymour’s 
Division, back into the creek.60  During this countercharge 
by the Confederate forces, Colonel Crutchfield was shot in 
the head.61  As soon as the Confederate held southern slope 
was free of Union forces, the Union guns around the 
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Hillsman House vaulted artillery rounds into the 
Confederate counter attack.62  Seeing the Confederate 
charge, Brevet Colonel Egbert Olcott turned part of his 
121st New York Volunteers toward the charging Confederate 
forces and charged, driving them back.63  There was some 
confusion in Custis Lee’s Division when officers attempted 
to restore the line.  Commodore John Tucker mistook the 
calls to fall back to the original line of defense for 
orders to fall further back up the hill away from Sailor’s 
Creek.  Upon realizing the mistake, he faced his men about 
and marched them back to the line under heavy fire.64  Some 
Confederate soldiers near the water’s edge, not knowing 
which way to turn, “floundered through the creek and gave 
themselves up as prisoners” to the men they had just driven 
back across the creek.65 
Confederate soldiers in the Savannah Guard from 
Kershaw’s Division, which was located on the extreme right 
of Ewell’s battle line, noticed that Union infantry, 
probably from Brevet Brigadier General Joseph Hamblin’s 
Brigade, were attempting to flank them through some thick 
woods.66  Before the Union soldiers could exit the woods, 
which were covered by thick underbrush, the Savannah Guard 
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fixed bayonets and counterattacked Wheaton’s men, driving 
them back through the woods.67  
As elements of Wheaton’s Division started to flank 
Kerhsaw’s Division, he ordered his division to back up the 
hill in an attempt to keep the Union infantry in front of 
him.  While backing up, he ran into elements of General 
Custer’s cavalrymen approaching from the rear.  Kershaw 
advised his men to attempt to make their escape, but 
surrendered with the better part of his division.68  
Approximately two hundred of his men were able to escape by 
running through the woods.69  Many dropped their guns and 
other accoutrements while fleeing the battlefield.70  
Most of the Confederate soldiers that were not killed 
or captured along Sailor’s Creek were rounded up by the 
Union cavalry approaching from the south.71  General Ewell 
himself saw none of the main engagement of his corps.  He 
went back to Anderson’s Corps to see how Anderson’s attack 
on the Federal cavalry was making out.72   
According to historian Jay Monaghan, Ewell surrendered 
to Custer.  However, Colonel William Truex, commanding 
Third Brigade, Third Division, VI Corps, reported that he 
received Major Pegram in a flag of truce that rendered 
General Ewell’s surrender to him.73  Wheaton stated in his 
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official report that the 5th Wisconsin Volunteers captured 
Ewell.74  Ewell’s biographer asserts that Ewell surrendered 
to Custer or one of his cavalrymen, who then allowed Major 
Pegram to take a note from Ewell to Custis Lee informing 
him that he was surrounded and that Ewell had surrendered.75  
Ewell wrote in his official report that he surrendered to a 
cavalry officer.76  It very well may have been that Pegram 
ran into Colonel Truex’s men when he attempted to get word 
to Custis Lee, and that is how Truex mistakenly believed 
that Ewell had surrendered to him.  Pegram failed to reach 
Custis Lee’s lines, but soon the Confederate general was 
surrounded.77  A brave Union cavalry officer, presumably 
from Custer’s Division, charged into Custis Lee’s line and 
begged them to surrender explaining to the bedraggled 
Confederates that they were surrounded.   The Confederate 
soldiers did not fire upon the cavalry officer because they 
admired his daring.  The Union infantrymen within Seymour’s 
Division again approached from the creek, this time with 
smiles on their faces.  After capturing their Confederate 
counterparts they opened their haversack’s and shared their 
hardtack with the hungry soldiers.78 
The last unit to surrender at Hillsman’s House was 
surprisingly the Confederate Marine and Navy detachment 
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commanded by Commodore John R. Tucker.  Tucker had backed 
his men into a stand of trees and continued to fire until 
men from the 121st New York Volunteers and the 37th 
Massachusetts moved forward and convinced them to 
surrender.79   
Lockett Farm 
A half-mile from Sailor’s Creek, Gordon had a portion 
of his command entrenched across the road leading to the 
creek in order to give the wagon trains time to get across.  
They kept up a constant fire on the approaching Federal 
forces.  Gordon resupplied ammunition to his rear guard by 
horseback, but the firing was so intense that the horse was 
shot as well.  First Division, II Corps assaulted and 
carried the line, causing Gordon’s men to retreat across 
the creek abandoning the wagons that had not yet crossed.80  
Then elements of Second Brigade, Third Division of 
Humphreys’ Corps, which was on the right flank of First 
Division, assaulted the flank of the Confederate line and 
into the ravine where the Confederate wagons were huddled, 
waiting their turn to attempt to cross the stream.81  After 
driving off what Confederate soldiers were guarding the 
train, Humphreys’ men captured approximately two hundred 
wagons and seventy ambulances along with about half the 
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horses and mules needed to pull them.82  Lead elements of II 
Corps crossed the creek that night in pursuit of the 
Confederate column, but, “owing to darkness the pursuit was 
disconnected for the night.”83  Although Humphreys’ Second 
Corps was able to destroy or capture most of the wagons 
that Gordon was protecting, Gordon’s Corps had escaped 
across Sailor’s Creek as the sun set, but firing continued 
“long after nightfall.”84  Humphreys worried about the 
intermixing of his Corps’ elements throughout the day 
called off the pursuit until he could straighten his lines 
the next morning.85  By daylight the next morning, General 
Gordon led his fragmented corps across High Bridge, tired 
and demoralized, but in far better shape then what was left 
of Lee’s other two corps.86   
  Neither Ewell nor Anderson had taken the time that 
day to notify Lee of the engagement they were involved in. 
Lee had ordered General William Mahone up to support 
General Longstreet, who was facing elements of Ord’s army 
at Rice’s Station.  Lee was scolding Mahone for “the 
severity of [his] note in respect to Colonel Marshall’s 
interference with [his] division the night before,” when 
Colonel Andrew R. Venable informed him that the Confederate 
wagon trains was captured at Sailor’s Creek.  Lee excitedly 
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asked “Where is Anderson?  Where is Ewell? It is strange I 
can’t hear from them.”87  Having no cavalry readily 
available, Lee ordered Mahone to Sailor’s Creek.  The army 
commander accompanied Mahone toward the creek, but upon 
reaching the crest of the hill along River Road overlooking 
the crossing of Big Sailor’s Creek, they realized they were 
too late.  Mahone remembered, “the disaster which had 
overtaken the army was in full view . . . teamsters with 
their teams and dangling traces, retreating infantry 
without guns, many without hats, a harmless mob, with 
massive columns of the enemy moving orderly on.”88  When Lee 
had seen what was left of two of his routed corps, he 
exclaimed, “My God! Has the army been dissolved?”89  Mahone 
replied, “No General, here are your troops ready to do 
their duty.”  Lee replied, “Yes General, there are some 
true men left.”  In referring to the approaching Union 
forces he asked, “will you please keep those people back?”90  
Shortly after reaching the top of the crest General Mahone 
saw General Anderson approaching.  Mahone rode down to see 
him and “discovered at once that he had lost his heart in 
the cause.”91  General Anderson looked defeated.  Mahone had 
requested that Anderson follow him to the top of the hill 
where Lee awaited him.  Upon reaching the top of the hill,  
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Lee without even looking at Anderson and with a fling of 
his left hand, ordered him to take the stragglers to the 
rear out of the way of Mahone’s troops, and then stated 
emphatically, “I wish to fight here.”92 However it was too 
late in the evening and although Federal cavalry rode close 
to Mahone’s Division there was no more fighting that night.   
Not all Confederate leadership within Ewell’s and 
Anderson’s embattled corps abandoned their men that day.   
General Wise, despite the difficult situation of being 
nearly surrounded and outnumbered, maintained his brigade’s 
lines and fought his way out to Lee’s lines across the 
Appomattox River.  Anderson had no idea of the fate of one 
of his brigades.  Lee feared that despite “fighting 
obstinately at Sailor’s Creek,” Wise’s Brigade was 
“surrounded by the enemy,” and that the General was 
“captured or worse.”93  
Union casualties for the three different engagements 
totaled approximately twelve hundred men.94  General Wright, 
in addressing his corps, stated that they had marched “with 
great cheerfulness and enthusiasm,” and “went into the 
fight with a determination to be successful seldom evinced 
by the best troops.”  He went on to say that, through 
“valor” the corps made Sailor’s Creek, “the most important 
 130 
of the last and crowning contests.” “The corps has always 
fought well, but never better than in the assault at 
Petersburg, and at Sailor’s Creek.”95   Another testament to 
the valor displayed by Union soldiers at Sailor’s Creek is 
the fact that fifty-five men earned the Medal of Honor for 
their actions that day.96 
Although General Sheridan estimated to New York World 
reporter George Townsend that there were about ten thousand 
prisoners captured at Sailor’s Creek, the number was closer 
to 7,700, with approximately another one thousand 
Confederate soldiers killed or wounded.97  In all, Lee lost 
almost 9,000 men along with ten flag officers and over 
three hundred wagons.  All but two hundred of Ewell’s 3,600 
man corps was either killed, wounded or captured.  
Anderson’s Corps, which numbered 6,400 men prior to 
Sailor’s Creek, lost an estimated 2,600, split evenly 
between Pickett’s and Johnson’s divisions.  Only the 
brigades of General Wise and Wallace escaped.98  The 
combined losses at Sailor’s Creek were devastating to the 
Army of Northern Virginia’s commander.  After Sailor’s 
Creek Lee’s army consisted of only two corps.99  The day had 
been devastating to Lee’s forces and even so resourceful a 
general as Lee had few options left.100  Burke Davis writes 
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that Lee had “a last desperate plan to save the army” by 
using the Appomattox River as a shield between his forces 
and Union forces.101  In fact, Lee was not sure what to do.  
He asked Mahone, who he believed knew the area well enough, 
“how are we to get away from here?”102  Mahone suggested 
that he march through the woods to High Bridge and cross 
the Appomattox River there and that Longstreet should 
follow through Rice’s Station to Farmville.103 By 11:00 p.m. 
Mahone withdrew his forces and headed for High Bridge.  
Once there he had came upon General Anderson and General 
Gordon, who were agreeing on the fact that their army’s 
situation was hopeless.104 
That night while Union forces encamped around Sailor’s 
Creek, Sheridan sent a dispatch to Grant, giving numbers of 
soldiers and he names of Confederate generals captured.  He 
wrote, that “If the thing is pressed, I think that Lee will 
surrender.” Grant forwarded the message on to Lincoln and 
the President responded, “Let the thing be pressed.”105   
A young messenger, Lieutenant John Wise, sent by 
President Davis, finally linked up with Lee after midnight.  
After Lee told Wise to inform Davis that he would not be 
heading to Danville, but instead attempting to reach 
Lynchburg, the dispatch carrier asked if there was any 
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point where Lee might try to defend.  Lee sadly responded, 
“No; I shall have to be governed by each day’s 
developments. . . . A few more Sailors’ Creeks and it will 
all be over—ended—just as I have expected from the 
first.”106 
As Wise and Lee discussed the future of the 
Confederate army, Wise’s father, Brigadier General Henry 
Wise, covered in mud and wearing an old blanket for warmth, 
led the remnants of his brigade across the Appomattox at 
High Bridge.  He immediately sought out General Lee.  Wise 
was cursing his division commander, General Bushrod 
Johnson, for fleeing the battlefield and leaving Wise’s 
brigade to fight its own way out.107  After at least 
mockingly reprimanding Wise for criticizing his superior 
officer, Lee asked him what he thought of their situation.  
Wise responded, “There is no situation!  Nothing serious 
remains, General Lee, but to put your poor men on your poor 
mules and send them home in time for Spring [plowing].  
This army is hopelessly whipped, and is fast becoming 
demoralized.”  Wise then exclaimed, “the blood of every man 
who is killed from this time forth is on your head.”  Lee 
responded that he could not surrender. “What would the 
country think of me, if I did what you suggest?” Wise 
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responded, “Country be d—-d! There is no country. . . .  
You are the country to these men.  They have fought for 
you.”108  Whether Lee made up his mind that night is 
unknown, but soon Federal forces under Grant would force 
the decision upon him. 
The Union columns continued their relentless pursuit 
of the depleted Confederate army.109  Officers and soldiers 
within Lee’s army were “utterly demoralized,” sure that 
“all was lost.”110  Lieutenant Wise, on an errand from 
President Davis, witnessed first hand the demoralization of 
the army after Sailor’s Creek.  He recalled that “the roads 
were filled with stragglers.  They moved ahead looking 
behind them, as if they expected to be attacked and harried 
by a pursuing foe.”111  Wise’s father cast his bony finger 
at his son and exclaimed, “This is the end!”112   
When the younger Wise was getting ready to return to 
Danville to explain to President Davis Lee’s situation, his 
father turned down his offered horse because it “was too 
pretty a little animal to make a present to a Yankee.”113  
As the young messenger departed Lee’s camp he “felt that 
[he] was in the midst of the wreck of that immortal army 
which, until now, . . . [he] had believed invincible.”114  
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On 7 April several senior officers under Lee 
“believing the extrication hopeless,” went forward to tell 
General Lee that they thought further resistance was 
pointless and that they should surrender.115  General Gordon 
requested that General William Nelson Pendleton, Lee’s 
Chief of Artillery, due to his closeness to Lee be the one 
to inform him of their opinion.  Pendleton went to 
Longstreet with this information and Longstreet did not 
agree, but according to Pendleton, felt that he should side 
with the others.  All, except Longstreet, signed a piece of 
paper affirming their opinion that surrender was 
inevitable, and Pendleton took it to Lee.  Lee thanked him 
for trying to relieve him of the burden of responsibility, 
but stated that it was his responsibility.116  
On 8 April 1865, Lee formally relieved Anderson, 
Pickett and Johnson of command.  Although Pickett had 
virtually no forces left, the other two generals still had 
men left in their units.  While Lee did not state why he 
relieved them, their conduct during the battle of Sailor’s 
Creek must have factored into his decision.117   
That same day, Union forces had once again blocked 
Lee’s army.  Since Lee had crossed the Appomattox River and 
the Union forces had stayed south of the river they had to 
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move less of a distance along the straighter route.  Lee’s 
route had circled north and then due southwest finally 
connecting back up to the South Side Railroad at Appomattox 
Station.118  Meade ordered his II and VI Corps commanders to 
attack “the enemy now in its front,” at 6:00 a.m. the next 
morning.  II Corps was designated to make the main effort 
with VI Corps in support.119  Before the attack commenced 
near Appomattox Court House, General Lee requested a 
suspension of hostilities with Meade’s Army of the Potomac.  
A similar truce had been negotiated on the other side of 
the court house as well.120  Meade recommended to Grant that 
the two commanders should meet and that he thought Lee 
would accept the terms of the surrender.121  Grant replied 
that he had no authority to suspend hostilities, until “it 
is with distinct understanding that [Lee was] prepared to 
accept” his surrender terms.122   
Within a few days Lee surrendered what was once the 
most feared army in the Civil War.  The destruction of two 
corps, attrition of a third, and the loss of ten flag 
officers was a blow that even General Lee could not 
overcome.123  Lee’s surrender “shattered the morale of 
remaining Rebels in the field.”124  Lieutenant John Wise 
returned to tell the Confederate President that he thought 
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that Lee’s army was doomed and that the sooner he 
surrendered the better.125   
Joe Johnston, commanding approximately thirty thousand 
soldiers in North Carolina, heard about Lee’s surrender on 
10 April. Within two days he met with President Davis at 
Greensboro, North Carolina, to persuade him to authorize a 
peace initiative.126   
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Being outnumbered was nothing new to Robert E. Lee.  
There is no doubt that the Union army was much larger than 
its Confederate counterpart.  Various writers have stressed 
that these numbers were critical to Lee’s defeat in the 
Appomattox Campaign.  The matter of the Confederate 
strength can be reconsidered.     
Through analysis of prisoner exchanges, Confederate 
stragglers, casualties during the assault on Petersburg, 
and desertions, historian William Marvel puts Lee’s 
strength at between 51,200 and 57,000 men when he reached 
Amelia Court House the day before the battle at Sailor’s 
Creek.1  Historian Chris Calkins estimates Lee’s strength 
at between 55,000 and 58,000 effectives at Amelia Court 
House.2  For the Union side, IX Corps did not take part in 
the Army of the Potomac’s pursuit of Lee’s army.  Only part 
of the Army of the James was involved in chasing after Lee.  
The combined numbers from what was left of the Army of the 
Potomac and the Army of the James coupled with Sheridan’s 
12,000 cavalrymen, totals approximately 80,000 Union 
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soldiers that were involved in Lee’s pursuit.  Based on 
these estimations, Union forces did not even have a two to 
one advantage over Lee’s army.   
Looking at opposing strengths in another Civil War 
battle can be instructive.  At Battle of Chancellorsville, 
Lee’s most trumpeted victory, General Joseph Hooker had 
approximately 134,000 men to Lee’s 61,000.  During the 
battle, Hooker’s cavalry outnumber Lee 11,500 to 4,500.3  
Despite these odds, Lee’s bold, daring actions during the 
battle resulted in the rout of the Union Army and victory 
for the Army of Northern Virginia.   
A ratio of three to one is commonly used by military 
planners when evaluating numbers of soldiers needed to 
attack a defensive position.4  Clearly, Union forces did 
not have a three to one advantage over Confederate forces 
during the Appomattox Campaign.  Understanding this, one 
must consider that factors other than Lee’s diminished 
strength were decisive in the Union victory at Sailor’s 
Creek.  More than focusing on the numbers, evaluating the 
Confederate leaders’ failures to adhere to the principles 
of war and the contrasting morale of the soldiers and 
leaders on both sides helps better to explain the 
overwhelming Union victory.   
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From 1862 to 1863, General Robert E. Lee’s Army of 
Northern Virginia dominated its northern counterpart, even 
though he was almost always outnumbered.  Union leadership 
was characterized as cautious, slow and even incompetent.  
Although the Army of the Potomac was able to maintain its 
formidable defensive position and therefore defeat Lee at 
Gettysburg, General Meade’s failure to exploit Lee’s defeat 
and chase after him was criticized by many.  Even as late 
as the battle at Cold Harbor in June 1864, Union soldiers 
still feared Lee’s vaunted army.  Soldiers sure of death 
wrote their names and addresses and pin them to the backs 
of their coats so that their families could find out if 
they were killed.5   
One critical factor changed the Union soldier’s 
outlook—leadership.  Starting with the bloody Wilderness 
Campaign, despite the fact that Lee checked Grant’s 
advance, the Union soldiers began to have confidence in 
their commander.  For the first and only time of the war 
when Grant turned them south, he was cheered by his men.  
They understood that this commander was different and began 
to have hope that the war would end with a Union victory.6  
As historian T. Harry Williams argues, “Grant above all 
other Northern generals grasped the great truth—that the 
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ultimate objective in war is the destruction of the enemy’s 
principle army.”7   
Sheridan declared in his memoirs that once Grant’s 
military history was analyzed “it [would] show . . . he was 
the steadfast center about and on which everything else 
turned.”8  The confidence and determination of one man had 
infected an army.  The officers who served with Grant 
“found him clearheaded and cool in battle at all times.”9  
Sheridan affirmed that “From the moment he set our armies 
in motion . . . . it could be seen that we should be 
victorious ultimately.”10  By the spring of 1865, General 
Grant knew he had a general in Sheridan that would fight 
and win at any cost.11  The combination of the confidence, 
audacity and intuitiveness of the two men propelled the 
Union army after Lee’s forces at the beginning of April 
1865.  Historian George Milton calls Grant’s pursuit of 
Lee, the most “magnificent march” in the history “of the 
Army of the Potomac.”12  Unlike in previous campaigns, the 
Union soldiers knew they were chasing after victory.  Union 
soldiers carried additional rations attempting to move 
unhindered by their supply wagons, and “were expected to 
cover thirty miles a day,” in order to catch Lee’s army.  
“Your legs must do it, boys!” their officers kept shouting 
 151 
to them. “Your legs must do it!”13  Although weather, 
terrain and logistics may have caused the decisive battle 
to happen at Sailor’s Creek, Union soldiers with high 
morale inspired and led by brilliant leadership made Lee’s 
defeat highly probable. 
On the other hand, the Southerners started losing 
faith in their leadership.  Despite claims by Davis and 
false reports in Southern newspapers, both citizens and 
soldiers saw that the early victories the South had tallied 
against the North were a thing of the past.  Southerners 
saw in Grant a leader who unlike previous Union commanders 
was relentless and focused on their destruction.   As 
historian Robert Hendrickson explains, “The end could 
already be foreseen.”14  There was no denying Sherman’s 
invasion of the deepest parts of the South.  Mary Chesnut 
called General Longstreet a “slow old humbug” and wrote, 
“Oh for a day of Albert Sydney Johnston, out west; and 
Stonewall, if he could only come back to us here!!”15  
Colonel William B. Taylor of Lee’s staff, even before 
Sailor’s Creek, wrote to his mother, “Our army is ruined.”16 
Ewell’s words around the campfire the night they were 
captured by the Union army reflect a feeling of despair 
that existed within many Confederate soldiers by then.  He 
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avowed that ever since Grant’s army crossed the James River 
and laid siege to Richmond, the South had been doomed.17  
Speaking to General Horatio Wright the night they were 
captured, Ewell argued that Lee should surrender and waste 
no more lives.18  General Henry Wise’s comments to General 
Lee after Sailor’s Creek show that even those with fight 
left in them thought it “murder” to continue on.19  
One cannot discount Lee’s lack of supplies during the 
campaign as having a detrimental effect on Confederate 
soldiers’ morale, but once again this deficiency falls 
under leadership.  Had Davis heeded Lee’s warnings that the 
defenses of Richmond could not be maintained for much 
longer, and removed the Confederate government earlier, 
part of Lee’s difficulties during his retreat might have 
been solved.  Whether some official from the government 
ordered the trains carrying supplies for Lee’s army at 
Amelia Court House or not, the fact is that due to some 
sort of mistake, the supplies did not reach Lee.  Had the 
government been established in Danville and not frantically 
evacuating Richmond, with Union soldiers at its heels, the 
supplies might have reached Lee at Amelia Court House and 
in time to replenish his hungry army prior to the Battle of 
Sailor’s Creek.  Without that confusion and desperate 
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situation to evacuate the Confederate government, the 
trains could have possibly stopped where Lee had intended 
them too.   
 Leaders’ ability to capitalize on or failure to adhere 
to, the principles of war are even more directly tied to 
the results at Sailor’s Creek. Lee violated the principle 
of Security in the final campaign.  He allowed his forces 
to become spread too thin in an attempt to outrun the two 
Union armies that opposed him.  As a result, the different 
corps under his command were unable to support each other 
when smaller Union cavalry forces struck them from the 
south at Marshall’s Crossroads.  Grant had forced this 
frantic pace upon Lee by ordering his cavalry to constantly 
harass Lee’s columns while the Army of the James attempted 
to block Lee’s advance and Meade’s Army of the Potomac 
caught up.    
Unity of Command was probably the most critical 
principle of war violated by the Confederate leadership 
that day.  The Army of Northern Virginia had four separate 
corps operating during the retreat out of Richmond and 
three of them were operating virtually independent of each 
other on 6 April.  Not one of the senior commanders seemed 
to take charge of the entire Confederate effort, or call on 
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their beloved commander for instructions or assistance 
until it was too late.  Both Ewell and Anderson conferred 
with each other, but neither chose to take advantage of 
their interior lines and instead chose to fight two 
separate engagements.20  Lee’s top subordinates failed to 
perform as well as their Federal counterparts. 
Indeed, Grant gave his subordinate commanders a 
clearly identifiable and attainable objective. Grant made 
it clear to his officers and men that not Atlanta, nor 
Petersburg, not even Richmond was their objective.  Their 
objective was Lee’s army.  In modern military terms, Major 
General E. O. C. Ord’s Army of the James was to block Lee’s 
avenue of escape to Danville.  Sheridan’s cavalry was 
ordered to attrit and pin down Lee’s army wherever it could 
along the route, and Meade’s Army of the Potomac would 
destroy it wherever Sheridan could fix it.21  All three 
senior commanders and their subordinate officers understood 
their mission and their commander’s intent.  In this 
example, one can identify Grant’s successful use of the 
principles of Simplicity and Objective.22  Additionally, 
Grant had the right man at the right place in charge of the 
right forces to destroy two of the Confederate corps.  
Sheridan, located at Hillsman House, directed the combined 
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efforts of both the infantry and cavalry.  Subordinate to 
him, Wright commanded the infantry and Major General Wesley 
Merritt commanded the cavalry.23  Sheridan’s ability to mass 
both of his forces against Ewell’s Corps was essential in 
causing the Confederate units within Ewell’s Corps to 
surrender so quickly. 
One of the major criticisms of Grant is that he bashed 
away at the enemy head on, despite the extreme loss of life 
to his forces.  Defenders of Grant offer the Union 
commander’s successful maneuvers around Vicksburg as an 
example of Grant’s ability to effectively use the principle 
of Maneuver against his opponents.  Because of Grant’s 
comment to Meade in the Spring of 1864, about “not 
maneuvering,” his defenders shy away from citing any battle 
after that to prove his abilities to capitalize on the 
principle of Maneuver.  Critics focus on Grant’s dispatch 
to Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin Stanton during the 
Battle of Spotsylvania, when he wrote that he would “fight 
it out on this line if it takes all summer,” to argue that 
he was unimaginative in his approach to fighting Lee.24  
Indeed, some of Grant’s closest allies might have 
unintentionally fueled this criticism in some of their 
descriptions of him.  Even Grant’s own wife may have hurt 
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his cause when she told a New York Herald reporter that “I 
have no doubt that Mr. Grant will succeed, for he is a very 
obstinate man.”25  One of Grant’s staff officers had 
inadvertently added to this characterization by writing 
that Grant “habitually wears an expression as if he had 
determined to drive his head through a brick wall, and was 
about to do it.”26  But, in reality, during the Appomattox 
Campaign, Grant had maneuvered his forces several times 
causing Lee to react slowing his escape.27  From the point 
of Five Forks on to the battle of Sailor’s Creek, Grant 
capitalized on the principle of Maneuver, by first 
maneuvering an infantry corps along with his cavalry to 
Lee’s right flank and vulnerable supply lines, putting Lee 
at such a disadvantage he had to thin his lines in order to 
lengthen his right flank with Pickett’s division.  Grant 
took advantage of this maneuver by massing his forces for 
an attack all along the lines the next morning causing Lee 
to abandon his defenses around the city.  Then, Grant’s 
subordinate commanders, understanding his intent, 
maneuvered their forces several times in an attempt to put 
Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia at a disadvantage.  The 
constant attacks by the Federal cavalry significantly 
slowed the Confederate column by causing them to deploy to 
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meet the constant threats.28  First Sheridan was able to put 
just his security detachment of two hundred cavalryman but 
then additional cavalry and an infantry corps in front 
(south) of Lee at Jetersville, forcing Lee to abandon his 
planned route of retreat.  Ord’s attempt at burning High 
Bridge, despite the failure, caused Longstreet to push all 
available cavalry assets toward the bridge in order to save 
it.  Another important factor in the final outcome was the 
Union cavalry’s ability to destroy so many of Lee’s supply 
wagons.  By out maneuvering his forces, Union cavalry on 
several occasions destroyed Lee’s ability to resupply his 
army.  At Appomattox, Lee asked Grant for provisions for 
his army.  Lee told Grant “his men were nearly starving: 
that they had been living on parched corn for several 
days.”29  
Although Grant did not have a distinguished academic 
background, he may have paid attention to Professor Mahan’s 
class on the art of war.  For, besides all of the other 
principles, the one principle that the Federal general in 
chief used most successfully was the principle of 
Offensive.  Unlike previous Union commanders, Grant took 
the war to the enemy.  One is hard pressed to find another 
commander who fought against Lee and was able through his 
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own personal character to motivate his men in order to 
impose his will upon the enemy like Grant had done.  By 
continuing to lengthen his lines around Petersburg, then 
attacking on Lee’s flank, Grant made Lee react to him.  
Once he forced the Army of Northern Virginia out of its 
prepared defenses, he and his aggressive subordinates 
pushed his forces upon Lee, constantly making the rebel 
commander react to him.  First, due to being hotly pursued 
by cavalry and infantry, Lee had to place his cavalry along 
with the supply trains in an ultimately failed attempt at 
securing them.  Additionally, a hastened Union infantry 
approach march after the Confederate army forced Lee to use 
a whole corps to fight a rear guard action, further slowing 
his bedraggled army.  At Amelia Court House Sheridan was 
able to execute Grant’s intent by blocking Lee’s retreat 
toward Burkeville and Danville, forcing Lee to react yet 
again by moving his army in the direction of Farmville and 
the supposed safety of the Appomattox River.  Confederate 
General John B. Gordon best described the effects of 
Grant’s use of the principle of Offensive when he recalled 
the retreat march in his memoirs.  He wrote,  
“To bring up the rear and adequately protect 
the retreating army was an impossible task.  With 
characteristic vigor General Grant pressed the 
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pursuit.  Soon began the continuous and final 
battle.  Fighting all day, marching all night, 
with exhaustion and hunger claiming their victims 
at every mile of the march, with charges of 
infantry in rear and of cavalry on the flanks it 
seemed the war god had turned loose all his 
furies to revel in havoc.”30  
    
In fact, after a close look at the river and the 
terrain, one can surmise that this further exacerbated 
Lee’s difficulties in attempting to get away from the Union 
columns.  By moving above the river and following it toward 
Lynchburg, Lee moved in a circuitous path as compared to 
that of the Union infantry giving General Ord the ability 
to get in front of Lee’s forces near Appomattox Court 
House.   Lee, speaking to Lieutenant Wise the night of 
Sailor’s Creek, admitted that Grant had indeed gotten 
within Lee’s decision cycle when he told the young dispatch 
carrier that, “I shall have to be governed by each day’s 
developments.”31    
T. Harry Williams, in describing Grant, states that 
according to Grant, “the art of war was simple enough.  
Find out where your enemy is.  Get at him as soon as you 
can.  Strike at him as hard as you can and as often as you 
can, and keep moving on.”32  Historian Russell Weigley 
argues, “Grant proposed a strategy of annihilation based 
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upon the principle of concentration and mass, hitting the 
main Confederate armies with the concentrated massive 
federal forces until the Confederate armies were smashed 
into impotence.”33  Although Weigley identifies Grant’s 
strategy correctly, he did not identify it in consideration 
with the Appomattox Campaign and Sailor’s Creek.   
Confederate forces under Ewell and Anderson did not 
use what is termed today as combined arms.  Although there 
were limited artillery assets still within their commands, 
they failed to ensure they had any supporting artillery 
along with them.  Gordon, although attrited significantly 
during the fight, maintained his artillery with his corps 
and used it in extricating himself away from Humphreys’ 
Corps.  Union leaders, on the other hand, maintained their 
artillery near the front to support their infantry assaults 
against the Confederate lines.34  Grant summarized this 
ability in his memoirs when he wrote “The armies finally 
met on Sailor’s Creek, when a heavy engagement took place, 
in which infantry, artillery, and cavalry were all brought 
into action.”35  
No one can argue about the strategic importance of the 
capture of Vicksburg.  Nor can anyone deny that General 
Lee’s vaunted army had been soundly defeated at Gettysburg.  
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But neither was decisive in the final outcome of the war.  
It is time for historians and students of the Civil War to 
acknowledge that the Battle of Sailor’s Creek had been a 
decisive blow to the great Army of Northern Virginia.  In 
no other battle were so many general officers captured nor 
had Lee ever had such a large proportion of his army 
captured or destroyed in one battle.  Unlike previous 
battles, Union forces were not satisfied with holding the 
ground or merely pushing Lee’s army in one direction or the 
other.  The objective was not terrain, but the enemy force 
itself.  Grant had inspired, reshaped, and reoriented the 
Union army to hunt down and destroy their enemy—the Army of 
Northern Virginia.   
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